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This article develops an empirical framework for analysing the timing of international treaties. A
treaty is modelled as a dynamic game among governments that decide on participation in every period.
The net benefit of treaty membership increases over time. Spillovers among members and non-members
accelerate or delay treaty formation by transforming participation into a strategic complement or substitute,
respectively. The predictions of the model inform the estimation of the structural parameters, based on a
cross section of treaty ratification dates. With this approach, I estimate the sign and magnitude of strategic
interaction in the ratification of the Montreal Protocol, in the formation of Europe’s preferential trade
agreements, and in the growth of Germany’s network of bilateral investment treaties. Through a series
of counterfactual experiments, I explore different mechanisms that give rise to strategic interaction in the
formation of these treaties.
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1. INTRODUCTION
What drives countries to cooperate in the pursuit of common policy goals? Ever since World War
II, cross-border policy coordination has been on the rise in many areas, including military defence,
human rights, international trade and finance, public health, and environmental protection. While
the specific reasons behind such alliances differ widely, as a rule they materialize in situations
where coordinated efforts are better suited to achieve the common good than unilateral policies.
This suggests that collective rationality is a driving force behind international cooperation.
However, there are numerous international policy issues to which collective rationality would
dictate a cooperative approach and yet international cooperation fails badly. This failure to provide
global public goods or to manage common property resources efficiently is often attributed to
the adverse incentives faced by individual governments. If countries do not take into account the
external benefits of their contribution to the public good, the aggregate provision level falls short
of the social optimum (Samuelson, 1954). Worse, even though the provision of the public good is
desirable for all countries, some of them may prefer to free-ride by enjoying the external benefits
without sharing the cost.
At the national level, such conflicts between individual and collective rationality can be
resolved by the intervention of the government (Demsetz, 1967). At the international scale,
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however, there is no supranational authority that could coerce states into adopting efficient policies
if they run counter to national interests. Filling the void are international agreements. Under the
terms of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a state that ratifies a multilateral treaty
chooses partially to surrender its sovereignty and to subject its policies in a specific domain to
the rules and prescriptions of the treaty.1 In so doing, sovereign states agree to coordinate their
policies in mutually beneficial ways. By the very nature of sovereignty, however, the agreement is
fundamentally non-binding and states can always withdraw from it. Therefore, the fact that public
good provision is implemented through an international agreement should not change a country’s
incentives to contribute per se—unless the treaty alters the country’s incentives to cooperate in
other ways.
This article proposes a new empirical framework to shed light on these incentives. I develop a
structural econometric model that exploits the variation in ratification dates to estimate the sign and
magnitude of strategic interaction. A treaty is modelled as a repeated game among governments
that choose between two actions in every period: to participate or not. The difference in payoffs to
both actions—the relative payoff to cooperation—is assumed to increase monotonically over time.
This accommodates the possibility that a country’s attitude towards treaty participation changes
for reasons unrelated to other countries’ actions, such as an exogenous decline in compliance cost
or an increasing valuation of the treaty’s benefits.
My approach nests this hypothesis into a model where interdependent ratification behaviour
may arise as a consequence of strategic choices by forward-looking governments. To allow for
rich patterns of strategic interaction, I consider three types of spillovers. First, treaty membership
may generate positive spillovers to everyone else, reflecting the fact that public good provision
is the key objective in a large class of international agreements. Secondly, this spillover may
differ between treaty participants and non participants. Consequently, the relative payoff to
cooperation can either decrease or increase with the number of treaty members. If ratification
becomes less desirable as treaty membership grows, it is a strategic substitute (Bulow et al., 1985).
This parallels the free-riding incentive in a public good game with decreasing marginal benefits.
In contrast, if the relative benefit to cooperation increases with the number of treaty members,
ratification is a strategic complement. Strategic complementarity may arise for a variety of reasons,
including social preferences or concerns about reputation held by governments, discreteness of
the public good the treaty seeks to provide, or aspects of the treaty design itself. Thirdly, when
ratification is a strategic complement, the ratification game is supermodular and hence easy to
solve even when spillovers vary across country pairs. I exploit this feature to empirically test
specific channels through which strategic complementarity affects treaty formation.
The assumptions on the payoff function strike a balance between the need to accommodate
complex dynamic interactions arising in a broad class of treaties and the necessity of keeping
the empirical model simple enough to be viable in settings where data availability is often
limited to a single ratification history. The monotonicity assumption ensures that all countries
join the treaty eventually, which allows me to solve the dynamic game via backward induction.
In the payoff-maximizing subgame-perfect equilibrium, strategic substitutability delays treaty
ratification whereas complementarity has the opposite effect. If strategic complementarity is
sufficiently strong, ratification by one country triggers ratification by another, generating clusters
of ratification events in the data. These predictions identify the sign and magnitude of strategic
interaction in a structural econometric model of treaty ratification. Moreover, the structural model
1. The legal procedure of a state joining a multilateral agreement is the signature followed by ratification, which
marks the legal accession. In this study, I will be using the terms “join”, “accede”, “ratify”, “participate” interchangeably,
referring to the legal act of accession as opposed to a mere signing of a treaty.
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allows me to run counterfactual experiments to explore the role of such channels with a view to
optimal treaty design.
I apply this method to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer which
was opened for signature in 1987 and has since been ratified by 191 countries. Its Member States
have committed to phasing out emissions of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and other pollutants
that, via the depletion of stratospheric ozone, cause severe damages to human health and to the
natural environment. The Montreal Protocol is credited with accomplishing the provision of a
pure public good at the global scale, overcoming countries’ incentive to free-ride.
The success of the Montreal Protocol has been studied widely, not least because it seemed to
offer important lessons for the 1997 Kyoto Protocol whose targets and timetables for greenhouse
gas abatement closely followed the design of the Montreal Protocol. Earlier analyses attribute
much of the success of the Montreal Protocol to participation being a dominant strategy for the
dominant producer—the U.S.—and to the trade ban which deterred free-riding by fringe producers
(Benedick, 1998; Barrett, 2003, 1997b; Parson, 2003; Sunstein, 2007). This literature reveals that
incentives to participate in the Montreal Protocol depend on a complex combination of factors,
including the economics of ozone depletion, the industrial organization of the polluting industries,
specific features of the treaty design and aspects of international diplomacy more broadly. While
this literature has followed a qualitative approach, I offer a strictly quantitative perspective on
this important policy issue. Moreover, taking a model-based approach to estimation allows me
to tease apart the moving parts of the mechanisms that drive participation through a series of
counterfactual explorations.
In further applications, I demonstrate how my framework can be employed to study strategic
interaction in the diffusion of international treaties on trade and investment. It has been suggested
that the rapid proliferation of such treaties over the last 60 years can be explained in part by
strategic behaviour which arises because the treaties impose external costs on third countries. For
instance, the diversion of trade flows caused by a regional trade agreement may lead to a “domino
effect” by which non-member countries also slash tariffs and other trade barriers (Baldwin, 1993).
Likewise, a country can see its prospects for receiving foreign direct investment diminished when
a rival country signs a bilateral investment agreement that grants enhanced protection to the
foreign investor. While these theories suggest that participation is a strategic complement, there
is no conclusive evidence yet as to whether this matters empirically. To shed light on this, I apply
my framework to data on Europe’s preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and on the formation
of Germany’s network of bilateral investment treaties (BITs). This allows me to empirically test
whether the mechanisms proposed in the literature actually did create strategic complementarities
in the formation of these treaties.
Relation to the literature This article extends the empirical literature on timing games
in oligopolistic settings (e.g. Schmidt-Dengler, 2006; Sweeting, 2006; Einav, 2010) by solving
and estimating a discrete dynamic game of complete information where actions can be either
strategic substitutes or complements. Similar to independent work by de Paula (2009) it is shown
that clustering occurs as a consequence of strategic complementarity in the payoff functions.2
His contribution and the analysis in this article are complementary in the sense that they derive
this result starting with fundamentally different assumptions about the information structure
2. In a “synchronization game” with social interactions, de Paula (2009) derives a test for strategic complementarity
based on simultaneous stopping by multiple agents. Ackerberg and Gowrisankaran (2006) also exploit this for
identification, even though not in the context of a timing game.
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(incomplete versus complete), the time structure (continuous versus discrete), the strategy space
(irreversible versus reversible actions), and the solution concept.
From an econometric point-of-view, the framework presented in this article is an alternative
to duration models which Honoré and de Paula (2010) only recently extended to account for
strategic behaviour in a game with two players and irreversible actions. This article adds to their
work by developing an N-player game with reversible actions, which is a common setting also
in the literature on dynamic oligopoly (Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2010). The methods developed
in that literature require a data set sufficiently rich to estimate state transition probabilities and
policy functions for all players, which is impractical in the context of a single treaty. The advantage
of the method proposed in this article lies in the fact that it is feasible in settings with limited
data availability, including the case where only a single history of the game is observed. This is
achieved by limiting the set of payoff-relevant state variables to a time effect.
The application to the Montreal Protocol contributes to a sizeable literature on international
environmental agreements (see Wagner, 2001, for a survey). The workhorse in this literature
has been the “self-enforcing” agreements model (Hoel, 1992; Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993;
Barrett, 1994) which models treaty participation as a non-cooperative game played among
governments. While the basic version of this model is static, some authors have also considered
a supergame to allow for a richer strategies space (e.g. Barrett, 1994; Finus and Rundshagen,
1998; Asheim and Holtsmark, 2009) or the differential game to allow for richer dynamics
(Rubio and Ulph, 2007; de Zeeuw, 2008). This article develops and estimates the first model to
explain the timing of ratification across countries. The model accommodates heterogeneous payoff
functions with asymmetric strategic interactions—features that engender multiple equilibria and
may prevent an analytical solution in the self-enforcing agreements model (Barrett, 1997a;
McGinty, 2007). Since that model’s key prediction is the number of treaty members, its
empirical implementation is complicated given the lack of a sample of independent and
identical treaties. Consequently, previous empirical work has taken reduced-form approaches
(Murdoch and Sandler, 1997; Beron et al., 2003; Finus and Tjøtta, 2003; Murdoch et al., 2003;
Bratberg et al., 2005; Wagner, 2009; Bernauer et al., 2010; Aakvik and Tjøtta, 2011), limited
the number of agents to two stylized players (Auffhammer et al., 2005) or ignored strategic
interaction altogether (Congleton, 1992; Fredriksson and Gaston, 2000; Neumayer, 2002). This
article bridges the gap between theory and empirics by developing a strategic model of treaty
formation which is estimable using a cross-section of ratification times. Since information is
complete, countries condition their actions on observed participation rather than on unobserved
latent benefits as in Beron et al. (2003). Furthermore, since endogenous effects are identified off
the time intervals between subsequent ratification decisions, a priori there is no need to specify
a political or economic channel through which interactions work—though the relevance of such
channels can and will be tested.
By applying my framework to PTAs, I contribute new evidence pertaining to the long-standing
controversy over whether regional trade integration is a stepping stone or a stumbling block
for multilateral trade liberalization (Baldwin, 1993; Panagariya, 1999; Bhagwati, 2008). The
application to BITs contributes new evidence on the endogenous formation of institutions that
govern foreign direct investment. Although the significance of such institutions for the efficiency
of international capital mobility can hardly be overstated, BITs have received little attention by
economists so far. There is, however, a sizeable literature on this topic in the field of international
relations. A more detailed discussion of how the present article extends the empirical literatures
on PTAs and BITs is relegated to Section 5 below.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 develops a theoretical model
of the timing of treaty ratification and derives the key testable implications. Section 3 explains
how these implications are exploited for identification and estimation of the model parameters.
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Section 4 applies the framework to study the ratification of the Montreal Protocol and Section 5
discusses further applications to trade and investment agreements. Section 6 concludes.
2. A TIMING GAME OF TREATY PARTICIPATION
The goal of this article is to develop an empirical framework that allows researchers (1) to infer
the nature and channels of strategic interaction from a history of participation decisions, and (2) to
conduct counterfactual experiments. The structural approach is based on a game theoretical model
that should be general enough to fit a broad class of treaties, while also being specific enough
to generate testable predictions on equilibrium play that inform the estimation of the model
parameters. This section introduces the model and explains how these requirements condition the
modelling choices.
2.1. Model setup
Treaty participation is modelled as an infinite-horizon game played among N countries. Countries
are assumed to have complete information about all primitives of the game. In each period
t ∈T ={0,1,...} all countries choose simultaneously whether to participate in the treaty (ai =1)
or not (ai =0).3 In line with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, countries can costlessly
withdraw from the treaty. Country i’s continuation payoff in period t under strategy profile s∈St
is given by
Vi(s,t)=
∞∑
τ=t
πi(ai(s,τ ),a−i(s,τ ),τ )e−ri(τ−t) (2.1)
where πi(·) denotes the per-period payoff function of country i, a(s,t) is the action profile induced
at time t by strategy profile s and ri >0 is country i’s discount rate. Each country i chooses its
strategy si so as to maximize Vi(si,s−i,0) taking as given the strategies s−i chosen by the other
countries. The following transversality condition ensures that this programme has a well-defined
solution as time goes to infinity
Assumption 1. limt→∞e−ritπi(a,t)=0 ∀i∈ I ∀a∈A.
Assume further that the per-period payoff takes the form
πi(ai(t),a−i(t),t)=
{
γ0
∑
j =iwijaj(t) ifai =0
−φi +g(t)+γ1∑j =iwijaj(t) ifai =1, (2.2)
where γ0,γ1,{φi}i∈I are parameters and the weights wij ∈[0,1]∀i,j∈ I measure the intensity of
country j’s participation decision on country i’s payoff.
This specification admits the possibility of both exogenous and endogenous changes in the
incentive to participate. This incentive is characterized by the relative payoff to cooperation,
parameterized as
πi(a−i,t)≡πi(1,a−i,t)−πi(0,a−i,t)=−φi +g(t)+γ∑j =iwijaj(t) (2.3)
where γ ≡γ1−γ0. The sum of the first two terms determines a country’s private incentive to
ratify the treaty.
3. I adopt standard notation, i.e. I denotes the set of countries, Ai ={0,1} the action set, and A=∏i∈I Ai the action
space with generic element a= (ai,a−i), where a−i ∈A−i ≡∏j =i Aj is the vector of actions taken by all countries other
than i.
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The following assumptions on the payoff function are designed to pin down three common
features that determine the level of participation in a broad set of international treaties. First, I
allow for positive externalities that arise in treaties that provide a public good.
Assumption 2. ∀i∈ I, ∀t ∈T, ∀a,a′ ∈A such that a−i ≤a′−i, a−i =a′−i;
πi(ai,a−i,t)<πi(ai,a′−i,t).
Next, to allow for an exogenous driver of treaty participation I assume that the relative payoff
to cooperation increases over time, i.e. πi(a−i,t+1)>πi(a−i,t)∀a−i ∈A−i.
Assumption 3. The function g(t) is strictly increasing and differentiable in calendar time.
This assumption nests the hypothesis of non-strategic ratification behaviour. If γ =0 then the
incentive to cooperate is invariant with respect to the number and identity of other contributors,
i.e. πi(a−i,t)=πi(a′−i,t)∀a−i,a′−i ∈A−i.
Alternatively, the relative payoff to cooperation may increase or decrease if an additional
country joins the treaty. The sign and magnitude of this strategic effect depend on the parameter
γ. If γ >0 then the relative payoff to cooperation exhibits increasing differences πi(a−i,t)≤
πi(a′−i,t) a−i ≤a′−i,a−i =a′−i and participation in the treaty is a strategic complement as
long as the inequality is strict for at least one country. In turn, if γ <0 the relative payoff to
participation decreases when an additional country joins the treaty and hence participation is a
strategic substitute.
This simple yet general specification encompasses a broad set of models and settings with
rich patterns of strategic interaction that may affect the timing of treaty ratification. For instance,
in the case of a pure public good one would set wij =b to reflect non-excludable external benefits
and assume constant (γ0 =γ1) or decreasing (γ1 <γ0) marginal benefits of contributing to the
public good. In contrast, if the treaty bans Member States from trading with non-Member States,
then the incentive to participate increases as a country’s most important trading partners join the
treaty.4 To reflect this, one would calibrate wij on bilateral exports and assume γ1 >γ0.
Notice that strategic complementarity or substitutability can also arise in more sophisticated
models of public good provision. In a differential game setting, contributions to a public good
with decreasing marginal benefits are strategic substitutes when the public good is continuous
(Fershtman and Nitzan, 1991) and complements when the public good is discrete (Kessing, 2007;
Georgiadis, 2015). The simple framework proposed here gives up some of the rigor and elegance
of those theoretical models in order to give empirical tractability to the estimation of strategic
interaction based on readily available ratification data. As I will show next, the one-parameter
specification of strategic interaction is sufficient to generate sharp predictions on equilibrium
play. These predictions allow me to estimate fundamental parameters of the model from the data,
without assuming the nature of strategy interaction a priori.
2.2. A graphical illustration of equilibrium with two countries
To gain some intuition for the solution of the dynamic game, consider the graphical representation
of a simple two-country version of the game in Figure 1. Figure 1(a) depicts the time path of the
relative payoff to cooperation (2.3) for both countries under the assumption that γ =0 (constant
4. I explain this mechanism in more detail in Section 4 below, and in Section C of the Online Appendix.
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(a)
(c)
(b)
(d)
Figure 1
Evolution of stage-game payoffs over time. (a) Constant differences. (b) Strategic substitutability. (c) Weak strategic
complementarity. (d) Strong strategic complementarity.
differences). It is easily seen that country i’s dominant strategy is to join the treaty only from
period t0i onwards.
The case of strategic substitutability (γ <0) is depicted in Figure 1(b). While the first country
joins the treaty at the same time as in Figure 1(a), the negative payoff externality means that the
relative payoff to participation shifts downwards for country 2 and hence delays ratification of
the treaty from period t02 until t
1
2 .
In contrast, if ratification is a strategic complement (γ >0), Figure 1(c) shows how the relative
payoff curve of country 2 shifts upward once country 1 joins the treaty in period t01 , so that
cooperation is country 2’s best response from period t12 onwards. Hence strategic complementarity
accelerates treaty formation compared to the base case depicted in Figure 1(a). With strong
strategic complementarity (γ 
0), the payoffs can be depicted as in Figure 1(d). Both countries
start out as non signatories but now both of them would be better off as treaty members even
before period t01 is reached. In fact, both cooperation and no cooperation are Nash equilibria
at every stage in the interval [t12,t01). Because of positive externalities (Assumption 2), both
countries prefer the cooperative Nash equilibrium to the non-cooperative one. Below I show that
the equilibrium refinement of strong renegotiation-proof equilibrium selects a unique subgame-
perfect equilibrium in which both players start to cooperate at the earliest possible period t12
and never revert to non-cooperative behaviour. An important implication of the case γ >0 is
that even asymmetric countries may begin to cooperate in the same period, as part of a cluster of
cooperation decisions. The empirical strategy adopted below exploits all these strategic effects for
parameter identification, i.e. the delayed versus accelerated ratification by late adopters depicted
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in Figure 1(b) and (c) as well as the feature of clustered participation decisions depicted in
Figure 1(d).
2.3. Equilibrium
This section analyses the equilibrium of the dynamic game under different assumptions about
the sign of γ. I start by characterizing the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the stage-game (t)=
(I,A,π (t)) played in period t, where π (t) is a vector of individual payoff functions πi(t) for
all countries. I then characterize the subgame-perfect equilibria of the infinite-horizon game
G={I,S,V (0)}, formed by the infinite sequence of stage games (t)∞t=0. All proofs are relegated
to the Appendix.
For the case of γ ≥0, the theory of supermodular games has established that pure-strategy
Nash equilibria of the stage game exist, that they are Pareto-ranked and monotonic in time.
Theorem 1. If γ ≥0, the stage game (t) has a smallest and a largest (in terms of the number of
treaty members) Nash equilibrium in pure strategies for all t ∈T. Both Nash equilibria are weakly
increasing in t. All players prefer the largest Nash equilibrium over any other Nash equilibrium.
Corollary 1. If γ =0 the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of stage game (t) is in dominant
strategies and is induced by the profile
a∗(t)=(a∗i ,i∈ I|a∗i =1{πi(1,0,t)≥πi(0,0,t)}).
Lest the special case described in Corollary 1, strategic complementarity engenders multiple
Nash equilibria in the stage game.5 This means that one can construct a great many subgame-
perfect equilibria of the infinitely repeated game. To obtain sharper predictions on equilibrium
play, I focus on the subgame-perfect equilibrium that maximizes total payoffs across countries.
Formally, this equilibrium is selected when applying the refinement of strongly renegotiation-
proof equilibrium.6
Definition 1. (Farrell and Maskin, 1989) A subgame-perfect equilibrium s is weakly
renegotiation-proof (WRP) if there do not exist continuation equilibria s1, s2 of s such that
s1 strictly Pareto-dominates s2. A WRP equilibrium is strongly renegotiation-proof (SRP) if none
of its continuation equilibria is strictly Pareto-dominated by another WRP equilibrium.
Since the stage-game Nash equilibria are ordered, any continuation equilibrium containing
dominated Nash equilibria gives countries an incentive to jointly renegotiate towards one that
does not contain dominated Nash equilibria. The SRP equilibrium profile is simply given by the
unique sequence of undominated Nash equilibria for every stage of the game.
5. Even when γ =0, countries may be indifferent about treaty participation in a particular period. I rule out multiple
Nash equilibria in this case by assuming that countries choose to cooperate whenever they are indifferent between both
actions. This assumption is not very restrictive in that it rules out equilibria that differ from the chosen equilibrium in at
most N periods. This is because Assumption 3 implies that potential ties in payoffs cannot last for longer than one period.
Moreover, in the empirical framework below it is assumed that payoff functions are subject to a continuously distributed
random disturbance (assumption 4 below), so that ties occur with probability zero.
6. This is the definition of renegotiation-proofness commonly used in the literature on the stability of international
environmental agreements (e.g. Barrett, 1994; Finus and Rundshagen, 1998; Asheim and Holtsmark, 2009). Pearce
(1990) reviews alternative definitions of renegotiation-proofness. In Section A of the Online Appendix, I analyse the
issue of multiple equilibrium with strategic complementarities in more detail and show that renegotiation-proofness
induces a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium at every stage of the game.
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A straightforward algorithm to compute this profile starts in the first period in which full
participation in the treaty is a Nash equilibrium. Working backwards in time, a country is dropped
from the set of signatories if it has an incentive to defect given the set of other signatories. Since
the Nash equilibrium monotonically increases over time, this procedure is guaranteed to find the
largest treaty (the largest Nash equilibrium) in every period. Theorem 2 below states that this
profile indeed constitutes the unique SRP equilibrium of the repeated game.
To obtain a formal representation of this algorithm, consider a Nash equilibrium am in period
t(m). Suppose that am induces exactly m countries to cooperate. Denote by Km ⊂ I the set of m
cooperators and use the definition of Nash equilibrium to write
πi
(
am−i,t(m)
)≥0 ∀i∈Km (2.4)
πj
(
am−j,t(m)
)
<0 ∀j∈ I\Km. (2.5)
Further, let t(m) ∈T denote the earliest period in which am is a Nash equilibrium of the stage
game. Then there is a country j(m) ∈Km that has the least incentive to cooperate
π(m)
(
am−j(m) ,t(m)
)
≤πi
(
am−i,t(m)
) ∀i∈Km (2.6)
and that prefers not to cooperate in the period just before t(m)
π(m)
(
am−j(m) ,t(m)−1
)
<0. (2.7)
Starting with m=N and working backwards to m=1, the algorithm uses equations (2.4–
2.7) recursively to define N sets K(m−1) ≡Km\{j(m)}, along with the action profiles inducing
them am ≡(aj,j∈ I|aj =1{j∈Km}), as well as N periods t(m). These elements are needed in the
following theorem to characterize the SRP equilibrium.
Theorem 2. If γ ≥0, the game G has a unique strongly renegotiation-proof equilibrium s∗=
{s∗(t)}∞t=0 where
s∗(t)=
(
s∗(i)(t),i∈ I|s(i)(t)=1{t≥t∗(i)}
)
.
Country j(i) joins the treaty in period t∗(i) and never withdraws from it at any time after that. The
sequence {t∗(i)}Ni=1 is given by t∗(N) = t(N) and
t∗(N−i) =min
[
t∗(N−i+1),t(N−i)
]
i=1,...,N −1, (2.8)
where t(m) is defined in equations (2.4–2.7) for all m=1,...,N.
Characterizing the equilibrium is particularly easy when γ =0 because each country always
has a dominant action and this is weakly increasing in t, so that the country never wants to
withdraw.
Corollary 2. If γ =0, the unique SRP equilibrium is given by the strategy profile s∗={s∗(t)}t∈T
where
s∗(t)={s∗i (t),i∈ I|s∗i (t)=1{t≥t0i }}
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and t0i is given by
t0i ≡{t ∈T |πi(0,t−1)<0≤πi(0,t)}. (2.9)
For the case of γ <0, the game is no longer supermodular and hence not much can be said about
the N-player game without imposing more structure. By assuming symmetric spillovers, I obtain
a framework that—while still complex—yields sharp predictions on equilibrium play for the
subsequent empirical analysis.
Theorem 3. If γ <0 and wij =c∀i,j∈ I s.th. i = j the stage game (t) has a Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies for all t ∈T. The Nash equilibrium is unique, up to the identity of treaty members,
and is weakly increasing in t.
Multiplicity of equilibrium only arises if two countries have very similar payoffs to cooperation
so that either one—but not both—can be treaty members in a Nash equilibrium. These equilibria
are not necessarily Pareto-ranked, so that either one can be part of the SRP equilibrium of the
supergame.
Theorem 4. If γ <0, wij =c∀i,j∈ I s.th. i = j, and countries get to decide on ratification in
descending order of their net benefit from treaty participation, φi, then the strategy profile s∗=
{s∗(t)}∞t=0 induces a unique strongly renegotiation-proof equilibrium of game G, where
s∗(t)=
(
s∗(i)(t),i∈ I|s(i)(t)=1{t≥t(i)}
)
.
Country j(i) joins the treaty in period t(i) and never withdraws from it at any time after that, where
t(i) is defined in equations (2.4–2.7) for all i=1,...,N.
To establish uniqueness of the SRP equilibrium, I resolve multiplicity of equilibrium in the stage
game by imposing sequential moves in the stage game, paired with a particular order of moves.
This trick has been widely applied in the literature on entry games. It is no longer needed below
when I consider asymmetric countries and let the period length go to zero.7
The intuition underlying the SRP equilibrium is as follows. Since payoffs are monotonically
increasing with time, full cooperation is a dominant-strategy equilibrium of the stage game
from some period tˆ onwards (specifically, tˆ = t0N for γ ≥0 and tˆ = t(N) for γ <0). Trivially, this
continuation equilibrium is WRP because no other profile is played along the equilibrium path.
It is also the unique SRP continuation equilibrium because full cooperation strictly dominates
every other stage-game equilibrium. Since no punishment of prior deviations is possible beyond
period tˆ, a Nash equilibrium of the stage game must be played in all earlier periods. For γ =0, this
gives rise to a unique sequence of stage-game Nash equilibria in dominant strategies. For γ >0,
the stage game may have multiple Nash equilibria but they are Pareto-ranked. Again, only the
largest Nash equilibria in each stage game can be part of the SRP equilibrium. All that remains
to be shown is that the algorithm correctly identifies the largest Nash equilibrium in every stage
of the game. This step is proven by induction exploiting the monotonicity of Nash equilibrium
with respect to time. For γ <0 and symmetric spillovers, there Nash equilibrium is either unique
or all Nash equilibria are equally sized, in which case the algorithm picks the one induced by the
assumed order of moves.
7. See the remark following the proof of theorem 4 in the Appendix.
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3. EMPIRICAL IMPLEMENTATION
3.1. Implications for empirical analysis
A comparison of the equilibrium outcomes characterized in the previous section reveals the
effects of strategic interaction on the timing of treaty participation. Strategic substitutability
does not affect the first country to ratify the treaty, but it delays subsequent ratification times.
In contrast, strategic complementarity accelerates participation by reinforcing the incentive to
cooperate. Moreover, if this effect is sufficiently strong, treaty ratification by one country triggers
ratification by others, leading to clustered ratification decisions, as depicted in Figure 1 above.
In order to exploit this prediction in an empirical application to learn about the sign and strength
of strategic interaction effects, one must rule out reasons for clustering that may occur even in
the absence of strategic complementarity. For example, as the length of a time period increases
from a day or week to a month or year, it is inevitable that ratification times of some countries
are clustered. To abstract from this effect, I characterize the equilibrium as time periods become
infinitesimally small.Afirst step into this direction is to write down the continuous-time analogues
to the equilibrium ratification times in the discrete-time game. Define t˜0i ={t˜ ∈R+|πi(0, t˜)=0}=
g−1(φi) as the first calendar time at which cooperation is a dominant strategy for country i, and
let t˜∗(N) =min{t˜ ∈R|πi(1, t˜)≥0∀i∈ I}=maxi
[
g−1
(
φi −γ∑j =i wij)] denote the first calendar
time at which full participation is a Nash equilibrium of the stage game. Computation of the
remaining calendar times t˜∗(N−1),..., t˜
∗
(1) in a SRP equilibrium is by straightforward application
of the algorithm described in Section 2.3 above.8
To establish the link between ratification events in discrete and continuous time, consider the
condition
πi(a−i,t)≥0 (3.13)
where a induces some set of member countries. For example, a=0 pins down t0i and a=1 pins
down t∗(N). The only difference between discrete periods t∗ ∈T and calendar time t˜∗ ∈R+ is
that the latter solves this condition with equality (due to the continuity Assumption 3 and by
the intermediate value theorem) whereas in the discrete-time game one needs to find the first
period on the time grid satisfying the weak inequality. On a time grid with period length one the
relationship between the two is thus given by t∗=t˜∗.
Consider now the sequence of discrete-time games {kG}, where kG is played over a grid with
period length 2−k , and k ∈N0.Anode on this grid, kt, has the property kt = t2k . That is, an increase
in k by 1 doubles the number of decision nodes and cuts the period length in half. As k goes to
infinity, the grid length 2−k goes to zero. The SRP equilibrium in the limit game is characterized
by the following theorem.
8. Some adjustments to the notation are needed. Denote by subscript (m) the player j(m) ∈ I who is just indifferent
between ratifying or not in the stage game played at time t˜(m) if all countries in Km participate. Compute this time as
t˜(m) ={t˜ ∈R|π(m)(am−j(m) , t˜(m))=0∧πi(am−i, t˜(m))≥0∀i∈Km ∧πj(am−j, t˜(m))<0∀j ∈Km}. (3.10)
Define
Km−1 ≡Km\j(m). (3.11)
Let KN = I and compute t˜(m),j(m),Km by recursive application of (3.10) and (3.11) for m=N,N −1,...,1. The equilibrium
ratification times are given by t˜∗(N) = t˜(N) and
t˜∗(N−i) =min
[
t˜(N−i+1), t˜(N−i)
]
i=1,...,N −1. (3.12)
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Theorem 5. As time periods become infinitesimally small, the SRP equilibrium of the limit game
∞G exists and equilibrium provision times converge to their continuous-time analogues
lim
k→∞
kt∗i ·2−k = t˜∗i ∀i∈ I.
With this result in hand, it is straightforward to establish that clustering of ratification times
is a probability-zero event if countries have different private net benefits of treaty ratification:
Assumption 4. For all i∈ I, φi ∈R is a continuous, i.i.d. random variable with distribution
function F(φ).
Theorem 6. Under Assumptions 1—4, if time periods become infinitesimally small then
clustering of ratification decisions among asymmetric countries occurs only in the presence
of strategic complementarity.
The theorem suggests an intuitive strategy to empirically identify strategic complementarity
in the timing of treaty participation: given a data set in which countries start out as non signatories
to a treaty and participate only at a later stage, the timing of the ratification decision traces out the
distribution of the relative benefits to cooperation. Furthermore, if ratification times are recorded
on a sufficiently fine time grid, clustering must be attributed to strategic complementarity unless
countries are identical.
3.2. Parameter identification
In line withAssumptions 3 and 4, I assume an exponential trend g(t)=eλt and an exponential index
of net cost φi=exp(x′iβ+
i) where 
∼N (0,σ
) is a vector of i.i.d. disturbances that are observed
by all players but not by the econometrician. The vector xi contains country characteristics that
shift the private net benefit of ratification. Assumption 1 is satisfied for ri >λ. The relative payoff
to ratification takes the form
πi(a−i,t)=−exp(x′iβ+
i)+eλt +γ
∑
j =iwijaj(t). (3.14)
Applying the results from Section 2, I compute the equilibrium ratification times {t∗(i)}i∈I using
the following algorithm:
Algorithm. Let K be a set of signatories including country i. Denote by t˜(K)∈RN the vector of
calendar times with elements
t˜i(K)= 1
λ
log
⎡⎣φi −γ
⎛⎝ ∑
j∈K\{i}
wij
⎞⎠⎤⎦ , i∈K . (3.15)
These are potential equilibrium ratification times of countries in K. Compute the identity of the
last country to ratify the agreement as
j(N) ≡argmaxk∈I {t˜k(I)}
and j(N)s ratification time as t∗(N) =t˜(N)(I).
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Recursively, for m=N −1,N −2, ..., 1, define the set Km ≡Km+1\j(m+1) and compute the identity
of the mth country to join the agreement as
j(m) ≡arg maxk∈Km{t˜k(Km)}
with ratification time t∗(m) =min
[
t∗(m+1),t˜(m)(Km)
]
.
The vector of model parameters to be estimated is given by (γ,β,λ). For fixed σ
 =1, the
parameter vector β and λ are parametrically identified from the joint distribution of country
characteristics and ratification times unless all countries ratify on the same day. 9 For γ =0, a
country’s optimal ratification time is given by t0i = 1λ ln(φi), i.e. the smallest integer to satisfy
−φi +eλt ≥0. This sweeps out the distribution of φi. For γ =0, the timing of ratification is also
determined by the magnitude of the net spillovers γ wij between any two countries i and j. There
are three sources of identification of the spillover parameter γ . First, for a given parametric
specification, the time elapsed between subsequent ratification events is informative about the
sign and magnitude of γ . Secondly, the presence of ratification clusters in the data identifies
strategic complementarity regardless of the specification. Both these sources of identification are
available when testing for the sign of γ under the assumption that spillovers are homogenous.
Thirdly, under the assumption that γ ≥0, data on spillover intensities wij between country pairs
(i,j) can be exploited to test whether strategic complementarity arises through a particular bilateral
channel, such as trade relationships, reputation effects, or equity concerns. In sum, this suggests
an analysis in two steps. In the first step, γ is estimated under the assumption of homogenous
spillovers wij = 1N−1 , i = j and wii =0. If this yields a positive estimate γˆ , a second estimation
substitutes heterogeneous spillovers for wij and proceeds under the constraint that γ ≥0.
This identification strategy rests on two key assumptions. First, Assumption 4 guarantees
that players are not identical with probability one, as the random disturbance shifts the payoff
function in a strictly monotonic fashion. This assumption is frequently made in applied research
to prevent “over fitting” of the model. Secondly, I assume a functional form of π with a smooth
and additive time effect g(t). If, contrary to this assumption, the relative payoff to cooperation
were subject to a common, positive shock, then two or more countries that are close to the
threshold will ratify immediately after the shock hits, even as the grid length goes to zero. This
would lead to an overestimation of the magnitude of strategic complementarity. Conversely, a
sudden drop in relative benefits to cooperation would result in an underestimation of strategic
complementarity or overestimation of strategic substitutability. Assumption 3 rules out common
shocks. Whether or not this is reasonable depends on the particular application at hand and will
be further discussed in context below.
3.3. Econometric estimation
Since the expectation of equilibrium ratification times does not have a closed-form solution in
the presence of strategic complementarity, I employ the method of simulated moments (MSM)
to estimate the parameter vector θ = (β,γ,λ). The estimation algorithm takes S random draws 
s
on the distribution of 
 and solves for the vector of ratification times, t(
s;θ0), for a given vector
of parameter values θ0. A consistent estimator of θ is given by
θˆ =min
θ
g(θ )′Wg(θ ) (3.16)
9. The statistical population considered here is comprised of individual countries. Alternatively, when a cross-
section of identical treaties is available, treaties can be considered as forming the statistical population.
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where
g= 1
N
N∑
i=1
(
μ(ti)− 1S
S∑
s=1
μ(ti(
s;θ ))
)
×f (Xi) (3.17)
is a vector of sample analogues to the moment conditions μ of observed and simulated
ratification times ti and ti(
s;θ ), respectively (see McFadden, 1989; Pakes and Pollard, 1989;
Lee and Ingram, 1991). The term f (X) denotes functions of the instruments X. The estimator θˆ
converges in probability to θ and
√
N(θˆ −θ ) converges in distribution to a normally distributed
random vector with mean zero and covariance matrix(
1+ 1
S
)[
E0
∂g′
∂θ
W−1 ∂g
∂θ ′
]−1
E0
∂g′
∂θ
W−1E0gg′W−1
∂g
∂θ ′
[
E0
∂g′
∂θ
W−1 ∂g
∂θ ′
]−1
. (3.18)
Using the optimal weighting matrix W∗=E0gg′ the asymptotic covariance matrix of
√
N(θˆ −θ )
can be reduced to (
1+ 1
S
)[
E0
∂g′
∂θ
W∗−1 ∂g
∂θ ′
]−1
. (3.19)
The estimation algorithm computes the simulated moments and evaluates the criterion function
(3.16) with W taken to be the identity matrix. Minimization of equation (3.16) in this fashion
yields an initial consistent estimate of θ that is used to compute a consistent estimate of W∗.
Standard errors are obtained via non-parametric bootstrap with re-sampling and 150 random
samples.
The moments are chosen so as to capture relevant variation in the data that helps to identify
the parameters of the model (Section D.2 of the Online Appendix provides more details). For the
minimization of the MSM criterion function (3.16) I sequentially employ two algorithms. First,
I use Goffe et al.’s (1994) implementation of the simulated annealing algorithm to avoid that the
algorithm gets trapped in a local minimum. After the simulated annealing algorithm has closed in
on a minimum, the result is turned over as the starting value to a Nelder–Mead simplex algorithm
which provides the final vector of parameter estimates.
4. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: THE MONTREAL
PROTOCOL
4.1. Background
The objective of the Montreal Protocol is to phase out emissions of CFCs and other man made
pollutants that deplete ozone molecules in the stratosphere.10 Since their invention in the 1920s,
CFCs were widely used as freezing agents in air conditioning, as aerosol propellants in spray
cans, as plastic-foam-blowing agents and as solvents in the manufacturing of microchips and
telecommunications parts. The soaring demand for these products fueled a very rapid growth in
worldwide CFC production that lasted until the 1970s, when atmospheric chemists predicted that
unaltered CFC emissions would substantially reduce ozone concentrations in the stratosphere.
This was a reason for concern because stratospheric ozone acts as a shield against harmful UV B
radiation from space which increases the prevalence of skin cancer and eye cataracts in humans
and causes damage to crops and ecosystems. By one estimate, fatal cases of skin cancer in the
U.S. population would increase by more than 3.1 million between 1985 and 2075 in the absence
10. Section B of the Online Appendix provides further details on ozone depletion and the Montreal Protocol.
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of further regulation of CFC emissions (EPA, 1987). The empirical relevance of stratospheric
ozone depletion became very salient in 1985, when new data showed what became known as
the “ozone hole”—a seasonal decline in ozone concentrations of about 50% compared to levels
measured in the 1960s. Subsequently, an international expert panel concluded that worldwide
ozone losses were wholly or in part due to CFCs.
Since CFCs mix uniformly in the stratosphere, policy-makers recognized the public-good
nature of CFC abatement and that its efficient provision would require international cooperation.
An international treaty, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, was
negotiated and opened for signature on 16 September 1987. This treaty stipulated a 50% cutback
in consumption of five CFCs from 1986 levels by 1998, with a stabilization by 1989 and a 20%
reduction by 1993. It also enacted a freeze of three halons at 1986 levels. Under article 5 of the
Protocol, developing countries with a per-capita consumption of less than 0.3 kg were granted
a grace period of 10 years to meet these obligations. To prevent leakage, the treaty prohibited
bulk imports of controlled substances from non-Member States and bulk exports from developing
countries. Trade between developed member countries was left unrestricted, but imports were
counted towards a country’s net consumption.11
The Montreal Protocol went into force on 1 January 1989, by which time it had been ratified
by most major developed countries. To encourage accession by large developing countries such
as India and China, the second meeting of parties held in London in June 1990 established
a multilateral fund to pay for the incremental costs of compliance incurred by these countries.
Contributions to the fund were the responsibility of developed country parties according to the UN
scale of assessment. Subsequent meetings brought forward the time table for phasing out ozone-
depleting substances, augmented the list of controlled substances and adopted measures to curb
illegal trade. The global phase-out of CFCs has been proceeding swiftly within the parameters set
by the Montreal Protocol, making the treaty one of the most successful international environmental
agreements so far.
4.2. Assumptions
The empirical framework developed above nests the competing hypotheses of complementarity,
substitutability and dominance of ratification decisions. This is well suited to capture the
multifaceted and fundamentally asymmetric incentives to participate in the Montreal Protocol.
The most salient aspect of the treaty is the public good of protecting the ozone layer. This
is reflected in Assumption 2. The payoff specification flexibly admits both constant marginal
external benefits of abatement (γ0 =γ1) or decreasing marginal external benefits (γ1 <γ0). The
model also admits the possibility of strategic complementarity (γ0 <γ1) which may arise as a
consequence of the trade ban, issue linkage, reputation effects or social preferences, as will be
discussed in Section 4.5 below.
Since ozone depleting substances accumulate in the stratosphere, the underlying economic
problem is one of controlling a stock pollutant with multiple agents. While it would be desirable to
fully account for the dynamics of stock pollution, to my best knowledge, the theoretical literature
on multilateral agreements over stock pollution has not yet developed models that are amenable
to econometric estimation.12
11. Art. 1 (6) of the Montreal Protocol defines a country’s net consumption as production plus imports minus
exports of controlled substances.Targets had to be met as a weighted average across all controlled substances, with
weights corresponding to their “ozone-depleting potential”.
12. This literature uses differential game theory to analyse multilateral agreements for controlling stock pollutants
among N countries. In order to be able to calculate a numerical solution to such a model, Rubio and Ulph (2007) assume
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Therefore, I resort to simpler dynamics, governed by the function g(t)=exp(λt), which are
consistent with an exogenous process—such as GDP growth—driving participation. Using the
standard model of the voluntary provision of a public good, Murdoch and Sandler (1997) have
argued that income growth was the principal driver of CFC abatement before the Montreal
Protocol went into force. This income effect predicts that, as countries grow richer over time, more
of them are willing to assume the cost of complying with the abatement targets mandated under
the Montreal Protocol. Modelling GDP growth as an exponential trend is standard. Additivity and
the uniform growth rate λ are simplifying assumptions made to ensure tractability of the model.13
As was explained in Section 3.1 above, identification of γ hinges on the assumption that
there are no common shocks to π . For example, a sudden cost drop that occurs only in country
i gets absorbed into the estimate of φi while a smooth decline in the cost of CFC substitutes
gets absorbed into the estimate of λ.14 Both leave the estimate of γ unaffected. In contrast, an
unanticipated drop in the cost of CFC abatement that pushes several countries over the threshold
causes clustering of ratification decisions and hence increases the estimate of γ .
In principle, the assumption of a smooth trend in the net benefits to ratification is not testable.
In view of an analysis of CFC abatement cost in the U.S.—the world leader in CFC production
at the time—by Hammitt (2000) the possibility of unanticipated drops appears rather unlikely.
Hammitt documents that inflation-adjusted wholesale prices for CFCs increased monotonically
over time (his data cover the years from 1986 until 1994). Had prices fallen during this time
period, unanticipated drops in marginal abatement cost would seem to be more of a concern.
In fact, Hammitt shows that contemporary estimates of marginal abatement cost published by
EPA in December 1987 and August 1988 underestimated the realized cost. This suggests that, if
anything, countries were expecting actual abatement cost to be too low and would have had an
incentive to postpone ratification once they found out. Since this would lead to downward bias in
the estimated γ , the results obtained for γˆ >0 below can be interpreted as conservative estimates
of strategic complementarity.
4.3. Data
The data are taken from various sources and summarized in Table D.1 in the Online Appendix. The
endogenous variable is the day on which a country ratified the Montreal Protocol, which marks
the legal act of acceding to the agreement. Ratification dates are available at UNEP’s ozone web
site.15 The mean time to ratification in the sample of 140 countries is 5 years, 2 months, and 10
days. More than 20 years elapsed between the first and last ratification (see also Figure D.1 of
the Online Appendix). This suggests that the net benefits of joining were highly dispersed and
provides ample variation for the estimation of the empirical model. Moreover, while ratification
by most countries is spaced out over time, some ratified the treaty in clusters, e.g. in the same
month or week, or even on the same day.
The choice of covariates in the vector x is subject to a tradeoff. Ideally, one would like to
include all variables that could possibly shift a country’s net benefits. In practice, however, the
that all countries are identical. A recent strand of theoretical research blends contract theory and dynamic games to analyse
the optimal design of agreements over stock pollutants (Harstad, 2012, 2015; Battaglini and Harstad, 2015).
13. An alternative justification for the monotonicity Assumption (3) is that, in a world with a monopoly country
producer, that country would eventually find it worthwhile to curb its use of CFCs and switch to a “backstop technology.”
I am grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this argument.
14. Recall that the empirical model does not discriminate between smooth reductions in costs and smooth growth
in the benefits of abatement over time.
15. See http://ozone.unep.org (last accessed on January 15, 2016).
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need to estimate a highly nonlinear model with a relatively small data set dictates a parsimonious
specification that conserves on degrees of freedom and minimizes multi-collinearity.16 The most
severe known consequence of the depletion of the ozone layer is an increased risk of skin cancer.
Per capita income and population (both in logs) are thus expected to shift outward the net benefit of
abatement in per capita and in absolute terms, respectively. Since stratospheric ozone is thinning
more quickly in higher latitudes, the benefit of CFC abatement should be higher there. Whether
or not a country hosts a CFC producing firm is expected to shift the cost of CFC abatement. A
dummy for article 5 countries picks up structural differences between developing and developed
countries, as well as the effect of the grace period granted to the latter. Furthermore, I include a
dummy variable for article 5 countries that joined after the London Amendments were negotiated
in June 1990. This controls for unanticipated changes in the incentive to participate which resulted
from the offer of financial aid to developing countries that acceded to the treaty.
All covariates are evaluated at their 1986 levels—the year before the treaty was opened for
signature—in order to preclude simultaneity issues. Country characteristics such as GDP in 1995
U.S.$ and population size in millions were taken from the World Development Indicators.17 The
producer dummy equals 1 for all countries that report positive production of any of the five CFCs
regulated under the Montreal Protocol, based on production data taken from UNEP (2015). The
list of countries with article 5 status was obtained from the UNEP web site. The latitude variable
is taken from the CIA World Fact Book and refers to the location of the country’s capital.18
4.4. Global interaction effects
Table 1 reports estimates of the parameter vector (γ,β,λ) when symmetric weights wij = (N −1)−1
are imposed. The parameter γ can thus be interpreted as a global strategic interaction effect and
can take on either positive or negative values. The first three columns of the table report different
the estimates obtained for different sets of covariates. The estimated γ is positive and statistically
significant for all specifications, indicating that ratification decisions are strategic complements.
Columns 1-3 show that the point estimate for γ diminishes slightly and becomes more precise as
further covariates are added to the model.
The estimated coefficients on the variables shifting the net cost of accession are robust
across specifications and in line with intuition. For example, the negative coefficient on per
capita income suggests that richer countries place a greater value on environmental quality.
Similarly, the negative coefficient on population indicates that populous countries benefit more
from global abatement efforts in absolute terms than less populous countries. The coefficient on
the dummy variable for article 5 countries is negative and suggests that the 10-year grace period
for abatement lowered the cost of accession. In contrast, the dummy variable ART5xLONDON
must, by construction, enter with a positive coefficient in the cost term. The coefficient on CFC
production is positive and reflects the fact that producer countries were facing higher compliance
costs, ceteris paribus. The point estimate for latitude is statistically insignificant.
16. For example, the final specification includes a dummy variable for CFC producing countries and not the country’s
actual CFC consumption because the latter is highly collinear with income, population and article 5 status. Table D.2 in
the Online Appendix lists all included covariates along with the rationale behind their inclusion and the expected signs
of their coefficients.
17. Available online at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators (last accessed on
January 18, 2016).
18. Available online at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ / (last accessed on January 18,
2016). The variable is reported in hundreds of degrees for computational reasons.
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Both the estimation results for γ and the observed clustered ratification events in the data lend
empirical support to the fundamental decision-making process proposed in this article.19 Acrucial
aspect for the plausibility of this mechanism is that a country correctly anticipates ratification
by another, so that both can plan ahead and try to coordinate the ratification date in mutually
beneficial ways.20
In the real world, do countries—especially democratic ones—have the ability to actually
coordinate on the same ratification date, as posited by the model? Benedick (1998, p. 116f)
describes a compelling case-in-point. Eight out of twelve Member States of the EU (then EC)
ratified the Montreal Protocol simultaneously on 16 December 1988. Two other Member States
ratified two weeks later, and the other two countries had ratified the Protocol already two months
earlier. This coordination was achieved by the European Commission asking its Member States,
many months before, to ratify the Montreal Protocol simultaneously with the Commission.
Obviously, this coordination device was not perfect, but it worked for the majority of countries,
and despite the fact that the process had to be approved by eight national parliaments.
The coefficient estimates in columns 1-3 are based on the assumption that countries coordinate
on the Pareto-efficient outcome at every stage of the game—embodied in the equilibrium
refinement of strong renegotiation-proofness. In view of the EC example, one might wonder
what an overly optimistic assumption about coordination implies for the point estimate of γ . To
investigate this, I re-estimate the model based on the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium with
complete coordination failure. In the simple two-player game shown in Figure 1(c), this means
that players start to cooperate in the latest possible period t01 rather than in the earliest possible
period t12 . Imposing coordination failure more than triples the point estimate γ in column 4 of
Table 1. The reason is that, as coordination on the early period fails, strategic complementarity
must be stronger to rationalize a given speed of ratification in the data. This is why the preferred
estimate in column 3 can be viewed as a lower bound on the magnitude of global strategic
complementarity.
How strong are the strategic complementarities implied by the estimated γ parameters?
The structural model allows me to answer this question by comparing the predicted ratification
sequence that arises with strategic interaction to the sequence of ratification that results when
the strategic interaction effect is removed. The latter is obtained in a counterfactual experiment
that sets γ =0 and simulates the ratification times based on the parameter estimates for the
remaining model parameters. Panel B of Table 1 reports the mean (median) difference between
the ratification times obtained in the counterfactual experiment without strategic complementarity
and those predicted by the fitted model with γˆ >0. In the preferred specification reported in
column 3, strategic complementarity accounts for a reduction by 208 days (190 days) in the mean
(median) ratification time. Relative to the non-strategic counterfactual, strategic complementarity
accelerated the mean (median) ratification time by 12% (9%). This effect is economically
significant. Under the alternative equilibrium selection rule where coordination fails, the reduction
in the mean (median) time to ratification is even larger and amounts to 22% (17%).
4.5. The sources of strategic complementarity
Having established that global interaction effects in the ratification of the Montreal Protocol are
strategic complements rather than substitutes, I now turn to studying the sources of this effect. The
19. Sections D.2 and D.3 of the Online Appendix analyse in detail the goodness of fit and the robustness of these
results to changing the specification, the functional form of the time trend and the sample size.
20. As illustrated in Figure 1(d), when strategic complementarity is strong there is usually a window of opportunity
for coordinating ratification times.
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TABLE 1
Parameter estimates: Global interaction effect
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Parameter estimates
γ 4.665 3.874 3.398 11.665
(1.581) (1.041) (1.072) (2.967)
Constant 3.813 4.069 3.828 3.343
(0.430) (0.369) (0.386) (0.163)
Log income p.c. −0.285 −0.319 −0.302 −0.165
(0.055) (0.048) (0.049) (0.033)
Log population −0.179 −0.188 −0.184 −0.154
(0.042) (0.043) (0.042) (0.039)
CFC producer (D) 0.042 0.015 0.019
(0.021) (0.005) (0.005)
Latitude 0.047 −0.560
(0.025) (0.168)
Art. 5 country (D) −0.259 −0.320 −0.253 −0.215
(0.093) (0.106) (0.088) (0.052)
Art. 5 × post-London (D) 1.327 1.333 1.318 1.406
(0.160) (0.159) (0.161) (0.147)
λ ·104 10.123 10.094 9.934 10.881
(1.115) (1.118) (1.080) (1.118)
B. Acceleration of ratification times w.r.t. non-strategic counterfactual
 mean (days) 263 226 208 411
(%) 15 13 12 22
 median (days) 233 205 190 391
(%) 11 10 9 17
Coordination yes yes yes no
Notes: N =140 countries. Spillovers are symmetric wij = 1N−1 ∀i = j and wii =0∀i. Bootstrapped standard errors are in
parentheses.
economics and international relations literature on international treaties have discussed specific
government interaction effects that engender strategic complementarity. It has been suggested
that governments (or their constituents) have preferences for fair and equitable sharing of the
abatement burden, or that social norms engender a reputation loss for non-signatories. It has
also been pointed out that linkage of environmental cooperation to other international policy
issues, or to international trade, can deter free-riding. In what follows, I briefly review how these
effects induce strategic complementarity in the context of the Montreal Protocol (a more detailed
review of this is relegated to Section C of the Online Appendix) and use the empirical framework
developed above to test whether they matter empirically. This is accomplished by using actual
data on bilateral spillovers to calibrate wij in equation (2.2) before estimating the parameter γ ≥0
associated with a particular mechanism of interaction between governments.
4.5.1. Economic dependency and the trade ban. Previous research has conjectured
that a country’s ratification decision may be sensitive to the behaviour of countries upon which it
is economically dependent. Using data on the early phase of the Montreal Protocol, Beron et al.
(2003) test whether a country i is more likely to follow suit to another country j’s ratification if a
large share of i’s exports go to j. I adopt their “power matrix” by computing spillover weights as
wij = exports from i to jtotal exports from country i . (4.20)
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I compute these weights as the average export shares between 1980 and 1986, using bilateral
flows of total commodity exports from the NBER-United Nations Trade Data (Feenstra et al.,
2005).21
Another reason for including trade-based measures of interdependencies is the treaty’s ban
of trade in controlled substances between parties and non-parties. Barrett (1997b) argues that
this ban transformed trade in controlled substances into a club good, the benefits of which were
exclusive to Member States. Once the club reaches a critical size, trade with Member States gives
higher benefits than trade with non-Member States (cf. Section C.2.4 of the Online Appendix).
To gauge the effect of trade restrictions on ratification, one can thus consider the bilateral export
shares of controlled substances before the Montreal Protocol went into force. While the UN Ozone
Secretariat has a mandate for collecting these data, it is not allowed to publish them. Therefore,
I approximate trade in controlled substances using bilateral export flows for a set of four-digit
industries that either produce controlled substances or that rely heavily on those substances as
inputs. In selecting these industries, I follow UNEP’s guidelines for Member States regarding the
use of customs data to comply with reporting requirements UNEP (1999) (cf. Figure D.2 in the
Online Appendix).
4.5.2. Issue linkage and reputation effects. Another mechanism for creating comple-
mentarity is by linking different policy issues. Diplomats may choose to negotiate different topics
jointly in order to achieve more stable outcomes (Tollison and Willett, 1979; Sebenius, 1983).
Folmer et al. (1993) and Cesar and de Zeeuw (1996) provide specific examples of how such
interconnections can help to stabilize an international environmental agreement. Essentially, the
greater the number of policy issues in which two countries are involved the better the prospects
for linking those issues in a mutually beneficial way. In order to measure this effect, I calibrate
wij to the degree to which country pair i,j is also involved in one of R pre-existing international
agreements,
wij = 1R(N −1)
R∑
r=1
1{i and j signed treaty r}. (4.21)
These weights are computed using data collected by Hathaway (2002) on membership in eleven
eminent international agreements. I focus on pre-existing treaties and use membership status as of
1986 in order to avoid potential simultaneity between the decision to join the Montreal Protocol
and to ratify other treaties.
Closely related to issue linkage is the notion that states ratify international agreements out of a
desire to conform with other countries. For instance, Hoel and Schneider (1997, p. 155) argue that
“a government may feel uncomfortable if it breaks the social norm of sticking to an agreement
of reduced emissions, even if in strict economic terms it may benefit from being a free rider”. In
the present model, their argument implies that country i’s reputation benefit from ratification is
greater the more of its “peers” are among the signatories.22 Hence, the treaty weights (4.21) can
also be interpreted as a plausible (though not the only conceivable) proxy for the reputation cost
of breaking a social norm.23
21. Section D.1 of the Online appendix provides more details on the computation of these and other spillover
weights.
22. In a binary choice framework, a cost exclusive to non-members is equivalent to the benefit γ
∑
wij exclusive
to Member States.
23. Fundamentally, it remains challenging to distinguish empirically between issue linkage and social norms
because it might well be the implicit threat of retaliation in various policy domains which enforces social norms at
the intergovernmental level.
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4.5.3. Fairness and equity. Preferences for fairness and equity have always been pre-
eminent in the public debate on international environmental agreements and have shaped many
such treaties in one way or another. For example, most agreements on transboundary pollution
stipulate uniform percentage reductions in emissions because they appear to be more equitable
than differential abatement targets. Fairness has received considerable attention in the recent
economics literature on social preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels,
2000), and has been given some consideration in the literature on environmental agreements
as well (Hoel, 1992; Lange and Vogt, 2003). Here I allow for the possibility that the decision to
ratify the Montreal Protocol is at least partially driven by concerns about fairness and equity. In
particular, I conjecture that a treaty is perceived as more equitable the more large polluters have
joined it, where the size is measured as the share in global CFC emissions
wij =wj = (CFC emissions)j∑N
k=1(CFC emissions)k
. (4.22)
I use data on CFC consumption from UNEP (2015) to compute these weights. Consumption is
calculated as production plus imports minus exports of controlled substances and is reported by the
Member States to the treaty secretariat which monitors compliance. Consumption is measured
in metric tons and comprises all five CFCs that were regulated under the Montreal Protocol,
weighted by their ozone-depleting potential.
A positive coefficient γ means that accession of large emitters to the Montreal Protocol
accelerates ratification by other countries. In order to distinguish the effect of social preferences
on ratification from other size effects, I control for GDP using weights defined analogously
wij =wj = (GDP)j∑N
k=1(GDP)k
. (4.23)
Since size is a potential confounder of all of the strategic effects discussed here, I include the
GDP weights in all specifications.
4.5.4. Results. The sample for which all the weights can be computed contains 103
countries and is summarized in panel B of Table D.1 in the Online Appendix. Compared to the
larger sample used above, the average country in this sample is larger, richer, more likely to
produce CFCs and tends to ratify earlier.
Table 2 displays the results when the different weights are used in the estimation of the model.
Panel A reports the estimates for two interaction coefficients: the first one, γ , corresponds to the
particular weight—among the ones discussed above—that is used in the specification of the local
interaction effect. The second one, γGDP, corresponds to the GDP weights in equation (4.23).
The magnitude of the estimated γˆ coefficients is not directly comparable across columns
because the weighting matrices are calibrated in different ways. For better comparability, panel
B reports the acceleration of the mean ratification time that can be attributed to each channel
through which strategic complementarity affects ratification times. Using counterfactual analysis,
the partial effect of size is computed by subtracting the ratification times of the fitted model with
parameters (γ̂ ,γ̂GDP) from the fitted ratification times in a counterfactual scenario with (γˆ ,0).
Analogously, I compute the partial effect of the interaction effect measured by γ as the difference
between ratification times in the counterfactual model (0,γ̂GDP) and the fitted model. As before,
I report these differences both in days and in per cent relative to a non-strategic counterfactual
where γ =γGDP =0.
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TABLE 2
The sources of strategic complementarity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Weights wij Equal Bilateral exports Treaty CFC
Total Controlled
substances
A. Coefficient estimates γ
γ 18.630 3.662 3.964 27.750 6.499
(7.316) (1.307) (2.010) (10.634) (3.123)
γGDP 6.069 8.237 0.001 0.716
(3.625) (3.431) (0.001) (0.283)
B. Acceleration of mean ratification time w.r.t. non-strategic counterfactual
 in days
γ 273 185 110 148 392
γGDP 370 406 0 58
Both 440 432 148 417
 in percentage
γ 19 11 7 9 23
γGDP 22 24 0 13
Both 26 26 9 25
Notes: N =103 countries. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses.
The first column reports estimates of the benchmark case with equal weights. As before, I
find a positive and significant global interaction parameter γˆ . The implied acceleration in the
mean ratification time amounts to 273 days or 19% relative to a non-strategic counterfactual
scenario where γ =0. The γ parameters obtained using trade weights in column 2 are positive
and statistically significant. This means that, on average, countries were more likely to ratify the
Montreal Protocol when their principal trading partners were among the members – conditional
on the size of the trading partner in the world economy, which is picked up by γGDP. The effect is
also economically significant, as it brings forward the mean ratification time by 11% relative to
the non-strategic counterfactual.24 Following Beron et al. (2003), one could interpret this result
as the effect of economic dependencies on ratification. Economic dependency measured in this
way is necessarily a very broad concept because bilateral trade flows are correlated with a number
of country-pair effects, as is shown by the gravity literature.
When focusing on trade in controlled substances and products only, as in column 3, the γ
coefficient remains positive and statistically significant, and the implied acceleration of the mean
ratification time amounts to 110 weeks (7%) relative to a non-strategic counterfactual. That is,
most of the trade-induced strategic complementarity found in column 2 is associated with trade
in a narrowly defined segment of controlled substances. This lends empirical support to the
hypothesis that banning trade between signatories and non-signatories enhanced participation in
the Montreal Protocol (Barrett, 1997b).
Column 4 of Table 2 reports the results obtained when using treaty membership as weights.
Again, the estimated γ is positive and statistically significant, implying an acceleration in the
mean ratification time of a comparable magnitude as the ban in controlled substances (148 days
or 9% of the non-strategic counterfactual). This is in line with the strong positive association
24. Related to this, Neumayer (2002), using a duration model without strategic interaction, finds that export intensive
countries ratified the Montreal Protocol earlier.
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between ratification of international environmental agreements and membership in international
organizations found in reduced-form analysis (Bernauer et al., 2010). The mechanism suggested
here is one of local interactions between peer groups of countries that adhere to the same set of
social norms and are concerned about their reputation.
Finally, column 5 reports a positive and statistically significant γ -coefficient when simple
CFC consumption shares are used as weights. The acceleration of ratification times implied by γˆ
amounts to 392 days (23%) compared to the non-strategic counterfactual, meaning that ratification
of a treaty with targets and timetables for pollution control proceeds more swiftly once the large
emitters participate. This result is consistent with social preferences, in that an agreement that
includes the big emitters—and, hence, one that appears more equitable to other governments and
their political constituencies—enhances the incentive for ratification.
Because CFC consumption across countries is positively correlated with GDP, it is particularly
important in this specification to control for strategic interaction that may arise because of the
different size of countries and that might confound the estimates of γ. In column 5, this size effect
is picked up by a smaller yet precisely estimated coefficient on GDP shares, γˆGDP. This coefficient
is also statistically significant when considering the ban of trade in controlled substances
(column 3). There, γˆGDP implies a 24% acceleration in the mean ratification time relative to
the non-strategic counterfactual, which possibly includes the effect of social preferences not
explicitly accounted for in this specification.
4.6. Counterfactual analysis and implications for treaty design
A strength of the structural econometric approach lies in its suitability for counterfactual analysis.
So far, I have used counterfactuals as benchmarks for comparing the magnitude of strategic
complementarity across specifications and the contribution of the different γ coefficients to the
overall effect.
Here I conduct further counterfactual experiments that shed light on different aspects of
treaty design and negotiation strategy. I start by considering a scenario where a coalition of
countries ratifies the treaty within 180 days after it was opened for signature. I implement this by
assigning to each coalition member a subsidy that, on day 180, makes the country just indifferent
between ratifying or not, assuming that the agreement consists of coalition members only.25
Early ratification by the coalition likely accelerates the subsequent ratification pattern, but the
magnitude of this effect depends on the particular coalition under consideration. Moreover, since
the indifference condition implies a negative subsidy for some members of certain coalitions, there
is scope for side payments among early movers which can bring down the cost of coordinating
on early ratification.
Table 3 reports simulation results for coalitions comprised of (1) Member States of the
European Union, (2) the countries with the highest CFC consumption levels and a joint share of
90% of the total, (3) all producer countries and (4) all exporters of controlled substances with a
share of at least 5% in the sample. For each coalition, I calculate the percentage increment in the
average ratification time resulting from early ratification by the coalition compared to the fitted
model (with strategic interaction but without early movers). I separately report the increment
among non members so as to highlight the externality caused by the coalition. Moreover, I report
the total reduction in the ratification time per unit of φ, both with and without transfers. For
simplicity, I normalize this efficiency measure using the case of EU accession without transfers
25. The earliest ratification in the data occurs on day 197.
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TABLE 3
Counterfactual experiment: early ratification by a coalition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coalition European Top CFC CFC Top CFC
Union Consumers Producers Exporters
Acceleration of mean ratification times in per cent of ratification times
Among non-members 0.3 0.8 1.9 0.1
Among all countries 1.6 3.9 6.3 0.8
Reduction in ratification time per unit of φ (relative to column 1)
Without transfers 1.0 1.7 2.2 3.1
With transfers 1.0 3.4 4.1 3.6
Notes: All coalition members ratify before 180 have passed since the treaty opened for signature.
EU countries: Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Denmark, Greece, Spain.
Top CFC consumers: U.S., Japan, France, Italy, The Netherlands, China, Canada, Spain,
Australia, South Africa, Brazil, Mexico, Switzerland, Austria, Algeria, Denmark. CFC Producers:
U.S., Japan, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, Canada, Australia, Greece, China, South
Africa, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Venezuela, India. Top CFC exporters: Canada, U.S., Japan,
Belgium/Lux, France, Italy, The Netherlands.
as the reference. The simulations are based on the specification using export shares in controlled
substances, reported in column 3 of Table 2 above.26
The results show that all coalitions accelerate ratification by non members, albeit to a different
extent. The effect is largest for the coalition of CFC producers, which also causes the largest overall
reduction in ratification times. In contrast, the most efficient coalition consists of the top CFC
exporters, which accelerates ratification times more than three times more per unit of cost than a
coalition of EU-12 countries. However, when the coalition is allowed to share the cost of early
action in an efficient manner—by taxing net gainers within the coalition and using the revenue to
compensate net losers—then a coalition of CFC producers is the most cost effective negotiation
strategy for reducing the aggregate time to ratification.
In another counterfactual experiment I assume, inspired by the Kyoto Protocol, that the
U.S. never ratifies and that there is no trade ban on controlled substances. I find that U.S.
non participation alone delays the average ratification time of the other countries by 19% and,
combined with an abolishment of the trade ban, by 22% compared to the fitted model.
These numbers strongly suggest that early adoption by the U.S., the world’s largest producer
and consumer of CFCs, was crucial for jump-starting the ratification process, and that the
trade ban acted as a powerful catalyst. Further, the experiments on early adoption support the
view that securing early participation by (a coalition of) major CFC producers was the right
negotiation strategy initially. The finding that some coalition members can compensate others for
the incremental cost of ratifying early provides a rationale for why such payments were offered
to producers in developing countries under the London Amendments.
5. INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS
The above application has considered international trade relationships between countries only
through the lens of enforcing participation in a global environmental agreement. A different
though related question concerns the role of strategic complementarity in explaining the rapid
26. Table D.9 of the Online Appendix reproduces the results when simulations are based on the specification using
CFC consumption shares, reported in column 5 of Table 2.
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proliferation of agreements over trade and investment. This section applies the strategic estimation
framework developed above to shed light on this phenomenon, taking explicitly into account the
externalities that those treaties create for non-Member States. In particular, I analyse the timing
of PTAs between the EU and third countries, as well as the timing of Germany’s BITs with more
than 130 countries in the world.
5.1. Preferential trade agreements
PTAs have been growing rapidly since the late 1950s. By 2014, almost 300 such agreements
were in force (IMF, 2015). A PTA is the legal framework by which two or more countries form
a union in which goods produced within the union are subject to lower trade barriers than the
goods produced outside the union (Panagariya, 1999).
According to theory, a PTA shifts production from inefficient domestic providers to efficient
union members (trade creation) while also diverting trade from efficient third-country suppliers
towards union members that enjoy preferential treatment (Viner, 1950). The discriminatory
features of PTAs and their potential for trade diversion are at the centre of a scholarly debate about
the welfare effects of regional trade liberalization (Freund and Ornelas, 2010). While some view
PTAs as a threat to deeper multilateral trade liberalization (Bhagwati, 2008), others have argued
that the externalities created by PTAs on non-members further reinforce their proliferation, thus
causing trade barriers to fall like dominoes (Baldwin, 1993). The theories underlying both views
critically depend both on the type and magnitude of trade diversion and the political economy
of tariff-setting. The domino theory maintains that exporting industries in non-member countries
lobby for participation in the PTAin order to avoid the adverse effects of trade diversion (Baldwin,
1993). In contrast, Grossman and Helpman (1995) consider a model where special interest groups
lobby precisely for the most trade-diverting PTAs in order to gain enhanced protection from non-
members. The theoretical ambiguity has motivated a sizeable number of empirical studies on
the determinants of PTA formation, on their impact on trade and on their interaction with the
multilateral trading system (see Freund and Ornelas, 2010, for a comprehensive survey).
One strand of this literature focuses on the economic determinants of PTA formation.
Baier and Bergstrand (2004), Egger and Larch (2008), Baldwin and Jaimovich (2012), and
Jaimovich (2012) use large dyadic data sets to estimate binary choice models of the likelihood
that country pairs form a PTA. Bergstrand et al. (2016) estimate a duration model where the year
of PTA formation between a country pair is the outcome of interest. To account for externalities in
PTA formation, Egger and Larch (2008) estimate a probit model where the latent benefit of a PTA
depends on the spatially weighted number of PTAs in place within a 2,000 km radius. They find
evidence that a PTA between a country pair ij is more likely to occur if a nearby country pair kl
has also formed a PTA. Baldwin and Jaimovich (2012) combine the spatial probit approach with
trade-based “contagion” weights that proxy for the magnitude of trade diversion induced by the
PTA between k and l on countries i and j. They find that a nearby PTA increases the probability
of a PTA formation over and above the proximity effect found by Egger and Larch (2008) if its
predicted trade diversion effect is high, which lends empirical support to the domino theory of
regionalism.
The key strengths of this literature lie in the exploitation of large data sets and the use of well-
known econometric techniques to make inference in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity
and cross-sectional dependence. However, the identifying assumptions also imply that countries
do not form expectations about PTA formation among their trading partners. Rather, they merely
react to the formation of a new agreement after the fact. This assumption can be challenged on
the grounds that trade negotiations often drag on for years and receive a lot of media attention.
Therefore, I take a different approach and model regional trade integration as a dynamic game
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played by forward-looking governments capable of anticipating that new PTAs give rise to trade
diversion. This is in line with the wide-spread view that governments take into account the
strategic effects of trade policy.
5.1.1. PTA formation with the EU as a dynamic game. One of the first and most
eminent PTAs is the European Economic Community, which was founded in 1959 by Belgium,
France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands (henceforth referred to as the EC6
countries). During the post-war period, the EC6 has developed the largest network of PTAs in
the world (Ahearn, 2010). The formation of this network can be cast as a dynamic game of treaty
formation along the lines of the framework developed above. Countries have perfect information
and are free to accede and withdraw from the PTA in any period. Each country maximizes the
present discounted value of cumulative per-period payoffs, given in equation (2.2). The private
net benefit of not signing a PTA with Europe is normalized to 0. Signing is associated with a
private net cost φi which is gradually offset by the monotonically increasing trend g(t). This
accounts for the possibility that the PTA becomes more attractive over time for reasons unrelated
to other countries’ actions, e.g. due to GDP growth in Europe or because of decreasing trading
costs. Recall that, from an econometric point-of-view, g(t) is the trend against which the model
has to distinguish strategic effects that either accelerate or delay PTA formation.
Strategic interaction may arise if the PTA induces trade diversion. Given two countries that
both trade with the EU, the signing of a PTA between country A and the EU diverts some of the
trade between the EU and country B towards country A, and hence reduces country B’s payoff to
not signing a PTA with the EU (γ0 <0). By signing a PTA with the EU, country B benefits from a
reversion of the trade diversion effect, and, possibly, from trade creation with the EU. Both effects
imply that γ1 >γ0 and hence γ >0 in the relative payoff function given by equation (3.14). Trade
diversion thus creates strategic complementarity and accelerates the formation of PTAs.
The literature suggests that, if country B trades a lot with country A prior to the agreement,
it should be more affected by trade diversion than a country C that engages in little or no trade
with country A. Following this logic, I weight the impact of A’s ratification decision on country
B by the share of exports from B to A in B’s total exports, as in equation (4.20) above. This is an
upper bound on imports that country A may divert from B to the EU after forming the PTA.27
Since export flows may be endogenous to PTA formation, I also compute the export weights
in equation (4.20) based on exports predicted using a gravity equation.28 In addition, I compute
weights based on the inverse distance between countries i and j,
wij =(population weighted distance between i and j)−1 (5.24)
and weights that account only for the ratification of contiguous countries,
wij = 1{iand jshare a common border}∑
k =i1{iand kshare a common border}
. (5.25)
Being based on exogenous measures of trading costs, these “geographic” weights are arguably
correlated with i’s share of trade with country j and, hence, with the expected trade diversion
when j enters a PTA with the EU.
27. In addition, the PTA may divert bilateral trade flows between the EU and country B towards country A. This
effect should be proportional to pre-existing trade with the EU and depends on trading costs, for which I control in the
term φ by including the distance between a country and the nearest EC6 country.
28. See Section E of the Online Appendix for more details.
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5.1.2. Data. Data on PTAs between Europe and the rest of the world were downloaded
from the internet portal of the DG Trade of the EU Commission.29 I consider the entire history of
PTAs between the EC6 countries and third countries. The process starts with the establishment of
the European Economic Community in the Treaty of Rome. The treaty was signed on 25 March
1957, notified to GATT on 24 April 1957, and it entered into force on 1 January 1958. The date
relevant for my analysis is the date of notification, which is the earlier of the two dates that are
available in the database.
Data on country characteristics and bilateral commodity trade are taken from the GeoDist
and Gravity databases provided by CEPII (Head et al., 2010; Mayer and Zignago, 2011). The set
of covariates shifting φi follows the empirical literature which emphasizes the proximity of the
trading partners in geographic, cultural and economic terms. Specifically, I include a country’s
log per capita income, log population, the minimum distance to the EC6 countries (based on the
population-weighted distance between metro areas) and a measure of cultural proximity between
a country and the EC6 states.30 Because the fall of the iron curtain fundamentally changed the
geopolitical landscape, I also include a dummy for the fall of the Berlin wall on 9 November
1989. Panels A and B of Table E.1 in the Online Appendix summarize, respectively, the full data
set of 69 ratification events and a smaller data set consisting only of the fourty ratification events
following the fall of the iron curtain.
5.1.3. Results. Table 4 summarizes the estimates for the strategic parameters of the model
of EU trade agreements. Column 1 reports the results for the model of global interaction effects
(unrestricted γ and symmetric weights). The estimated γˆ is negative and statistically significant,
suggesting that PTA formation is a strategic substitute. Panel B of the table reports that this effect
delayed the formation of PTAs with the EU by 2,254 days or by 18% compared to a non-strategic
counterfactual.
This finding is robust to dropping the first twenty-nine PTAs from the sample and performing
the estimation only on the fourty PTAs that were signed after the fall of the iron curtain
(cf. Table E.2 in the Online Appendix). Although the model with symmetric spillovers rejects
strategic complementarity, I re-estimate the model with asymmetric spillovers and non-negativity
constraints on γ . This yields comparatively small and statistically insignificant point estimates for
both γ ’s (columns 2–5 of Table 4).As shown in Panel B, the point estimates imply 0% acceleration
in ratification time compared to the non-strategic counterfactual, i.e. the non-negativity constraints
are binding. In that sense, the estimation framework proposed here is robust to predicating the
estimation on an incorrect assumption about the nature of strategic interaction.
The estimation results do not support the domino theory of trade liberalization. Since this
effect hinges on the presence of trade diversion, a reason for this could be that “Europe’s PTAs
for the most part have not liberalized substantial amounts of trade” (Ahearn, 2010, p. 28). This is
in line with the argument that Europe’s PTAs overemphasize the promotion of EU standards as
opposed to the opening of closed sectors to trade (Bhagwati, 2008).
29. Available Online at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/ (last accessed on
January 15, 2016).
30. From the raw data I obtain dummy variables for (i) a common colonizer after 1945, (ii) a colonial relationship
after 1945, (iii) a colonial relationship ever, (iv) a colonial relationship currently, (v) a common official language, and
(vi) a common language spoken by >9% in both countries. After taking the maximum value (across the EC6 countries)
for each indicator, I add up the six indicators and standardize the resulting variable by its mean and standard deviation.
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TABLE 4
PTAs with the EU: estimation results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Global Interaction Sources of Complementarity
Weights wij Equal Distance Contiguity Exports
actual predicted
A. Coefficient estimates γ
γ – 61,140 22.140 0.003 474.960 30.624
(5,344.8) (49.563) (0.008) (755.660) (87.020)
γGDP 1.302 1.608 2.281 3.355
(6.554) (2.669) (4.533) (6.690)
B. Delay in mean ratification time w.r.t. non-strategic counterfactual
γ – 2,254 (– 18%) 0 0 0 0
γGDP 0 0 0 0
Notes: N =69. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. The full set of parameter estimates
is reported in Table E.2 in the Online Appendix.
5.2. Bilateral investment treaties
A BIT is an intergovernmental agreement that provides legal stability and protection of FDI. By
signing a BIT, two countries agree on a set of conditions concerning the admission and treatment
of FDI from the home country in the host country. The typical BIT grants extensive rights to
foreign investors, including the right to bring investment disputes before international arbitration
venues such as the World Bank’s International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID) or the UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).
Since the signing of the first BIT between Germany and Pakistan in 1959, the number of
BITs in the world has been growing, at first moderately until the mid-1980s, then at a rate of
more than a hundred new treaties per year throughout the 1990s. At present, there are 2,922 BITs
on record, of which 2,240 are in force (UNCTAD, 2015). While the traditional BIT involves a
developed home country and a developing host country, developing countries have increasingly
been forging BITs among themselves.
Despite their focus on FDI, BITs thus far have not received much attention by academic
economists. There is, however, a political science literature on BITs which coincides in that
“BITs have become the most powerful international legal mechanism for the encouragement
and governance of FDI” (Elkins et al., 2006).31 The obvious question of whether the enactment
of a BIT causes an increase in FDI has been addressed in a series of empirical studies
(Hallward-Driemeier, 2003; Tobin and Rose-Ackerman, 2003; Kerner, 2009; Egger and Merlo,
2012). Rather than offering a conclusive answer to this question, this strand of the literature
highlights the challenging endogeneity issues facing researchers who tackle this issue (Aisbett,
2007). Looking beyond the mere existence of a BIT, empirical research suggests that the treaty’s
ability to attract FDI hinges not so much on the stringency of dispute-settlement provisions granted
to the investor but rather on the good behaviour of the host government subsequent to signing
the BIT (Allee and Peinhardt, 2011; Berger et al., 2011, 2013). Furthermore, there is empirical
31. Much of this literature deals with the paradox that the “Hull rule”—a concept of customary international law
which prohibited expropriations and provided for prompt and adequate compensation if they occurred—gave way to a
regime of bilateral treaties that implemented even stricter standards of investment protection, rather than to a multilateral
investment agreement (e.g. Guzman, 1998).
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evidence that the existence of a BIT is positively associated with debt accumulation (Mina, 2013)
and subsequent PTA formation (Tobin and Busch, 2010).
Another strand of the literature argues that international competition for FDI among potential
host countries has been driving the widespread adoption of BITs (Guzman, 1998). To test this
hypothesis, which will be explained in more detail below, Elkins et al. (2006) combine data
on the diffusion of bilateral BITs signed between 1962 and 2000 with measures of economic
competition among host countries. Using a Cox duration model for home/host country dyads,
they find that potential hosts are more likely to sign BITs when their competitors have done
so. Neumayer and Plümper (2010) show that, rather than a capital-importing country being
influenced by the total number of BITs signed by other capital importers, as modelled in
Elkins et al. (2006), a capital-importing country is more likely to sign a BIT with a capital
exporter only if other competing capital importers have signed BITs with this very same capital
exporter.
5.2.1. Bilateral investment treaties as a dynamic game. While Guzman (1998) and
Elkins et al. (2006) do not present formal models, it is straightforward to cast their “competition-
for-capital” hypothesis as a dynamic game using the framework developed above. The game
is played by N potential host countries that compete for a fixed pool of FDI from the “home”
country. All countries decide in each period whether they sign a BIT with the home country. The
home country has all the bargaining power over the core terms as host countries compete with
other potential hosts. Therefore, the treaty is akin to a take-it-or-leave-it offer, the terms of which
are always attractive for the home country.
Elkins et al. (2006) argue that this is an accurate representation of the classical BIT where
capital flows from a developed country to a host country in the developing world. By taking
the diffuse, multilateral commitment to customary law to the bilateral level, a BIT allows the
host countries to signal their intent of contracting in good faith. The signal is credible because it
generates diplomatic, sovereignty, arbitration, and reputation costs in its observance and violation.
The treaty thus increases expected returns for investors and hence their propensity to invest in the
host country. At the same time, the BIT “gives host governments a competitive edge in attracting
capital” over rival countries, especially if there are otherwise doubts about their willingness to
enforce contracts fairly (Elkins et al., 2006, p. 823).
Suppose the per-period payoff of a host country is given by equation (2.2), where the private
net benefit of not signing the BIT is normalized to zero. As more of its rivals sign a BIT with the
home country, country i sees its prospects of receiving FDI diminished, i.e. γ0 <0. In contrast,
by signing the BIT the country can (at least partially) mitigate this negative externality of BITs
signed by its rivals, i.e. γ1 >γ0. In addition, there may be a benefit of being the only host country
to have signed a BIT. On the other hand, signing the BIT is costly in that the host country gives up
sovereign rights in the treatment of FDI, and because international arbitration raises the costs of
non-compliance.32 Elkins et al. assume that this benefit is not large enough to drive a host country
into signing a BIT in the absence of other BITs, i.e. the private net cost of signing φi is strictly
positive. I specify the relative payoff function to BIT ratification as in equation (3.14) above.
By decreasing the private net cost the time trend g(t) nests the hypothesis that the proliferation
of BITs is propelled by non-strategic drivers, such as (exogenous) growth in the overall pool of
FDI available from the home country. Competition for capital implies that γ =γ1−γ0 >0. This
32. The typical BIT provides more substantive protections than customary law, e.g. national treatment and most-
favoured-nation treatment of FDI in the host country, protected contractual rights, a guarantee to transfer profits in hard
currency to the home country and prohibited or restricted use of performance requirements (Elkins et al., 2006).
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TABLE 5
Germany’s BITs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Weights wij Equal Distance Contiguity Exports
actual predicted
A. Coefficient estimates
γ 4,353 31,171 2,073 5,393 96.099
(1,240) (8,749) (470) (1,925) (76.638)
γGDP 488.570 17,926 810.310 1,812.800
(145.010) (4,284.100) (331.73) (587.300)
B. Acceleration of mean ratification time w.r.t. non-strategic counterfactual
 in days
γ 2,522 2,767 1,694 1,217 1
γGDP 1,334 496 690 3,549
both 2,914 2,133 1,286 3,552
 in percentage
γ 27 22 14 10 0
γGDP 11 4 6 29
both 24 17 11 29
Notes: N =127 countries. All specifications assume coordination. Bootstrapped standard errors
are in parentheses. The full set of parameter estimates is reported in Appendix Table E.3.
completes the representation of the “competitive dynamic among potential hosts” depicted in
Elkins et al. (2006) as a dynamic game of BIT formation with strategic complementarity.
As in the previous applications, additional information can help with the identification of the
complementarity parameter γ. Elkins et al. (2006) argue that potential host countries—analogous
to differentiated products—are close substitutes for FDI if they have similar attributes. The
intensity of competition between two countries i and j should thus be reflected by their proximity
in attribute space wij.As in the model of PTAformation, I focus on geographic attributes which are
exogenous to treaty formation by specifying weights based on distance shown in equation (5.24)
and contiguity equation (5.25). In the BIT application, however, these attributes are not used as
proxies for trade flows but rather as direct shifters of the profitability of FDI. To allow comparisons
between the two models, I also consider trade weights equation (4.20) based on both actual and
predicted trade flows.
5.2.2. Data. Data on bilateral investment agreements are available from the International
Investment Agreements Navigator website maintained by UNCTAD (2015). Germany signed the
first BIT on 25 November 1959 with Pakistan and has since signed BITs with 134 countries, more
than any other country in the world. I augment data on Germany’s BITs with data on income
per capita, population, distance to Germany (all in logs), a counting measure of cultural ties with
Germany and a dummy variable for BITs signed after the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989.
I construct these data in the same fashion as described above in the context of the PTA model.
The final data set comprises 127 BITs and is summarized in Table E.1 in the Online Appendix.
5.2.3. Results. Table 5 summarizes the results for the strategic model of Germany’s
bilateral investment agreements. The first column suggests that strategic complementarity played
a statistically and economically significant role in explaining these treaties, accelerating BIT
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formation with the average country in the sample by almost 7 years or 27% compared to the non-
strategic counterfactual. The results reported in columns 2–3 can be interpreted as supporting the
hypothesis that host countries competed for German FDI. In particular, when the interaction is
limited to countries that are close (contiguous), and size effects are controlled for by a separate
parameter γGDP on GDP, the competition effect accelerates the mean time to BIT signing by
22% (14%) relative to the non-strategic counterfactual. Columns 4–5 show that export shares
matter less, and—it seems—only to the extent that they proxy for geographic distance. When
predicted export shares based on gravity models are used to measure the intensity of competition,
no acceleration of BIT formation is measured.
These findings are consistent with the competition-for-capital hypothesis in the context of the
typical match between a capital-exporting industrialized country and developing host countries.
Many of the more recent BITs defy this stereotype as they are formed by developing countries only.
Competition for capital may take a different shape in this context. In fact, when I fit a similar model
to data on 102 BITs formed by China since 1982, I obtain positive yet statistically insignificant
point estimates of γ in all but one specification (see Table E.4 in the Online Appendix). This
suggests that there are important differences in the patterns of strategic interaction engendered
between countries, even when the treaty contents are very seemingly similar.
6. CONCLUSION
This article has developed a general framework for empirically analysing the formation of
international agreements. Casting treaty ratification as a dynamic game, the framework nests
strategic and non-strategic mechanisms that drive countries to participate in an agreement,
and is amenable to econometric estimation using a single history of ratification dates. The
principal benefits are twofold. Unlike conventional duration models, my framework explicitly
takes into account strategic, forward-looking behaviour on the part of a government that decides
on participation in an international treaty. Moreover, by estimating the behavioural parameters of
a structural model, the framework can be used to conduct counterfactual experiments that explore
specific channels of interaction.
My framework is suitable for analysing a broad class of international treaties. I demonstrate
this in applications to a global environmental agreement, to preferential trade agreements and
to bilateral investment treaties. Over the past decades, international treaties in these policy
domains have been proliferating. While theoretical research has emphasized the scope for strategic
behaviour in each of these domains, it is far from clear to what extent strategic considerations have
contributed to this proliferation. The method proposed in this article provides applied researchers
with a model-based tool for empirically analysing this aspect of international treaty-making.
Empirical research on international agreements is subject to the fundamental limitation that
there are just about 200 countries in the world. The data-poor environment means that strong
assumptions need to be made before deeper insights can be gained from observed treaties. For
instance, analysing pooled data from different treaties requires an assumption that the distribution
of costs and benefits is identical across treaties. This article takes a different road by trying to
learn about strategic interaction from a single cross-section of ratification times. Inevitably, this
approach must be predicated on assumptions, some of which are strong. While some discussion
has already been provided when these assumptions were introduced, I expand on this discussion
here for the benefit of readers who are interested in building and extending on this framework in
their research.
Afundamental pair of assumptions is that the variation in the time to treaty ratification contains
information about payoffs, and that it is not driven by common shocks to these payoffs. These
assumptions are not testable per se. Econometrically, controlling for common shocks in this data
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environment is a formidable task. However, developing a framework that allows for time-varying
covariates could help to mitigate concerns about common shocks confounding the estimates of γ .
Another set of assumptions pertains to the specification of the model and functional forms
of time and country effects. Critical such assumptions are that the time effect enters the payoff
function additively and is common across countries. This is needed for identification because
otherwise ratification events could be clustered also in the absence of strategic complementarity,
simply because the relative payoff functions for two countries cross the treshold at the same
time. Moreover, this would break the link between the order of ratification and the net cost of
ratification, which is needed for the identification of φ. It is possible to relax these assumptions
in a hypothetical application where the time effect is known (e.g. calibrated to a country’s GDP
growth), though this may in itself require some assumptions. Apart from that, there may be a
small set of treaties for which pooling data is a defendable choice. In that case it is possible to
identify some of the objects in the payoff function under weaker assumptions on functional form,
e.g. by looking at order statistics across treaties.
Further assumptions enter via modelling choices such as common knowledge and perfect
foresight on behalf of governments. This may be more plausible than assuming the exact opposite
(i.e. no anticipation of future ratification choices), but it is clear that accounting for some of the
uncertainty surrounding treaty formation would add realism to the theoretical model.
I model treaty formation as binary choice problem. A worthwhile extension would be to
explicitly account for the level of participation, such as the reduction target for pollution emissions
or tariff rates. Related to this, extending the model to account for a richer set of state variables
would be of great value in applications such as agreements over stock pollutants.
These and other extensions are left as a topic for future research.
APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1. The action space A=∏Ni=1 Ai is a complete lattice because it is the direct product of N finite chains,
Ai. By assumption γ ≥0, the payoff function πi(a,t) is supermodular on A for each t ≥0,i∈ I (see Corollary 2.6.1 in
Topkis, 1998) and hence (t) is a supermodular game ∀t ∈T . Under these conditions, Topkis (1979) and Vives (1990)
have shown that the set of Nash equilibria is non-empty and contains a greatest and a least element. Milgrom and Roberts
(1990) have proven that these elements are pure-strategy Nash equilibria and that they are non-decreasing functions of
the parameter t. Moreover, they have shown that the largest Nash equilibrium is the most preferred one for all players. ‖
Proof of Corollary 1. In a dominant strategy equilibrium, the best response correspondence R(a−i,t)≡
argmaxai∈Ai πi(ai,a−i,t) is constant on A. Suppose first that R(·,t) is not constant. Then there exists some i∈ I and
a−i,a′−i ∈A−i such that a−i ≤a′−i and Ri(a′−i,t) =Ri(a−i,t). From assumption γ =0 we have that
πi(Ri(a′−i,t),a′−i,t)−πi(Ri(a−i,t),a′−i,t)=πi(Ri(a′−i,t),a−i,t)−πi(Ri(a−i,t),a−i,t). (A.26)
By the definition of the best response, the LHS of this expression is non-negative and the RHS is non-positive. Hence
both sides of the equation must be equal to zero. Since ties for different actions are ruled out, the equation can only hold if
Ri(a′−i,t)=Ri(a−i,t), a contradiction. Thus, each player has a strictly dominant action and the profile of dominant actions
constitutes the unique Nash equilibrium in period t. ‖
Proof of Theorem 2. I first use backward induction and the dominance property to prove that the SRP induces the largest
Nash equilibrium in every stage of the game. Next, I establish that the profile s∗ defined above selects the largest Nash
equilibrium of the stage game in every period t ∈T .
Step 1: SRP equilibrium induces the largest Nash equilibrium in every stage game. Denote by t0N the first period in
which cooperation is a dominant strategy for all players. Full cooperation is the unique NE of the stage game (t0N ) and,
by the monotonicity of equilibrium stated in Theorem 1, in all subsequent periods. Indefinite repetition of this profile
constitutes a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the continuation game G(t0N ). The equilibrium is WRP because it is
not dominated by any of its continuation equilibria. Since the action profile aN =1 dominates every other profile in the
stage game, there can be no other WRP equilibrium that dominates indefinite cooperation. Hence full cooperation is the
unique SRP equilibrium of the continuation game G(t0N ).
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It follows that there is no credible “punishment” that could be inflicted on a player who deviates in period t0N −1
and hence that any subgame-perfect equilibrium induces a Nash equilibrium of the stage game at node t0N −1. Backward
induction yields that a stage-game Nash equilibrium must be played in all previous periods, too. Moreover, the refinement
of strong renegotiation-proofness requires that none of these stage-game equilibria be Pareto-dominated, for any such
WRP profile t˜ would be dominated by another WRP profile s˜′ that induces the largest Nash equilibrium in stage t′ and is
otherwise identical to s˜. Hence the SRP equilibrium induces the largest Nash equilibrium in every stage game.
Step 2: The profile s∗ induces the largest Nash equilibrium in every stage game. By the monotonicity of the Nash
equilibrium vector in t, a player who cooperates in some period t′ will not revert her decision in any later period t′′ > t′.
For instance, the last player j(N) to cooperate in period t∗(N) strictly prefers to defect in period t∗(N) −1. Thus j(N) cannot be
part of the largest (and hence: any) Nash equilibrium in the periods t ≤ t∗(N) −1. Solving for the equilibrium path hence
boils down to finding, recursively for each player i∈N , the period in which i cooperates for the first time in the largest
Nash equilibrium.
The principle of induction is invoked to prove that, for each k =1, ... ,N −1 the strategy profile s∗ induces the largest
Nash equilibrium in the periods from t∗(N−k) until (but not including) t∗(N−k+1), i.e. until max[t∗(N−k),t∗(N−k+1) −1]. Consider
the base case k =1. Suppose first that t(N−1) ≥ t∗(N). For any such t(N−1) the strategy profile s∗ induces full cooperation,
i.e. the largest Nash equilibrium of the stage game from period t∗(N) onwards. Next, suppose that t(N−1) < t
∗
(N) and the
algorithm sets t∗(N−1) = t(N−1) according to equation (2.8). The definition of t(N−1) implies that cooperation by the players
in KN−1 is a Nash equilibrium of the game (t(N−1)) and that full cooperation is not. By monotonicity, this is true for all
t(N−1) ≤ t < t∗(N).
The inductive hypothesis maintains that, for some k such that 1≤k ≤N −1, the strategy profile s∗ induces the
largest Nash equilibrium in the stage game from period t∗(N−k) through max
[
t∗(N−k),t
∗
(N−(k−1)) −1
]
. The inductive step
is to prove that the profile s∗ induces the largest NE in all periods from t∗(N−(k+1)) until max
[
t∗(N−(k+1)),t
∗
(N−k) −1
]
. For
t(N−(k+1)) ≥ t∗(N−k) the algorithm assigns t∗(N−(k+1)) = t∗(N−k) and the inductive step follows trivially from the inductive
hypothesis.
Suppose now that t(N−k−1) < t∗(N−k). Then t
∗
(N−k−1) = t(N−k−1) and s∗ induces the profile aN−k−1 with the set of
cooperators KN−k−1 =KN−k\{j(N−k)}. From equations (2.4) and (2.6), the profile aN−k−1 is a Nash equilibrium of the
game in period t(N−k−1). For any larger Nash equilibrium a˜≥aN−k−1 in the stage game (t∗(N−k) −1) monotonicity
requires that a˜≤s∗(t∗(N−k)). Without loss of generality assume that s∗(t∗(N−k))=aN−k+l , i.e. N −k+l players cooperate in
period t∗(N−k). The “cluster size” l∈{0,...,k} is given by the value of l that satisfies
t∗(N−k) = t(N−k+l). (A.27)
To see that a˜ =aN−k+l let j=N −k+l and write
π(j)(aj−j,t∗(N−k) −1)=π(j)(aj−j,t(j) −1)<0
where we have used equations (2.7) and (A.27). For a˜≤aN−k+l player j(N−k+l)’s deviation incentive is equally strong
(γ =0) or stronger (γ >0). Thus any profile in which j(N−k+l) cooperates cannot be a Nash equilibrium of the stage game
(t∗(N−k) −1).
For l>0, the logic of this argument applies to all other players who cooperate under aN−k+l but not under aN −k−1.
For all j=N −k+l−1,...,N −k it is true that
π(j)(aj−j,t∗(N−k) −1)≤π(j)(aj−j,t(j) −1)<0
where the first inequality follows from Assumption 3 and the fact that t∗(N−k) < t(j) and the second inequality follows from
equation (2.7).
Thus, it must be the case that a˜=aN−k−1 and s∗ induces the largest Nash equilibrium in period t∗(N−k) −1. Monotonicity
implies that this is true for all periods t such that t(N−k−1) ≤ t < t∗(N−k). By the principle of induction, the claim must be
true for all k =1,...,N −1.
From equation (2.7) recall that player j(1) has no incentive to join the coalition at any time before t∗(1). Therefore, the
largest Nash equilibrium in periods t =0,...,t∗(1) −1 has no player cooperate. This concludes the proof that s∗ induces
the largest Nash equilibrium in every stage game. From step 1, this profile constitutes the unique SRP equilibrium of the
game. ‖
Proof of Theorem 3. Existence is proven by Berry (1992) in the context of a static entry game. The proof is by arranging
countries in increasing order of φi and finding the equilibrium number of treaty members m that satisfies
−φm +g(t)+γ (m−1)≥0>−φm+1 +g(t)+γ m. (A.28)
Since πi(a−i,t) is strictly decreasing in a−i the equilibrium number of treaty participants m is unique. Multiplicity
arises when φm and φm+1 are close so that
−φm+1 +g(t)+γ (m−1)≥0>−φm +g(t)+γ m, (A.29)
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/restud/article-abstract/83/4/1741/2223389/Estimating-Strategic-Models-of-International
by Universidad Carlos III user
on 18 September 2017
[14:49 10/9/2016 rdv054.tex] RESTUD: The Review of Economic Studies Page: 1774 1741–1778
1774 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
also holds.
Suppose that m is the Nash equilibrium number of signatories in period t, and that the Nash equilibrium is not
monotone. Then there must be a period t′ > t and a k such that −φk +g(t)+γ (m−1)≥0 and −φk +g(t′)+γ (m−1)<0.
This implies −φk +g(t′)>−φk +g(t), which contradicts Assumption 3. ‖
Proof of Theorem 4. Monotonicity implies that full participation is the unique Nash equilibrium of the stage game from
period t(N) onwards. Since no punishment of deviations is possible beyond this point, a stage-game Nash equilibrium
must be played in all periods prior to t(N). From Theorem 3, a stage game equilibrium in pure strategies exists and
is unique up to the identity of players. When multiple equilibria arise in the stage game, this leads to multiple SRP
equilibria as the stage-game equilibria are not ranked. While it is clear from the proof of Theorem 2 that the algorithm
used to compute equilibrium selects the largest Nash equilibrium in each stage game, this does not resolve the multiplicity
issue because all equilibria have the same number of treaty members. Consider a period t with two equilibria that both
have m Member States, as described by equations (A.28) and (A.29) above. Suppose that the algorithm has selected the
equilibrium where country (m+1) is a member and not country (m), as in equation (A.29). This means that in some
period t′ > t, the algorithm dropped country (m) from the set of treaty members but not (m+1). From equation (2.6), this
only occurs if −φm +g(t′)<−φm+1 +g(t). However, this contradicts −φm +g(t′)≥−φm+1 +g(t) which is true because
we have ordered countries in increasing order of their net cost φ. The algorithm circumvents this by always picking the
country with a higher π for given m and t, i.e. lower cost φ. This is precisely how the ambiguity is resolved by the
order of moves assumed in the theorem. ‖
Remark. As the length of the time periods goes to zero, the order of moves assumption is no longer needed.
From Theorem 5, country m will ratify at time ˜t(m) =g−1 [φm −γ (m−1)] which is strictly earlier than t˜(m+1) =
g−1 [φm+1 −γ (m−1)] given Assumption 3 and the definition of t˜(m) in equation (3.10).
Proof of Corollary 2. Under assumption γ =0 equation (2.4) is equivalent to πi(0,t)≥0 and condition (2.7) is equivalent
to π(m)(0,t(m) −1)<0. From this we have that candidate equilibrium times satisfy π(m)(0,t(m) −1)<0≤π(m)(0,t(m))
which coincides with the definition of t0i in equation (2.9). To see that t∗(m) always equals t(m), suppose that there is some
l>m such that t(l) < t(m). Hence we have that
π(m)(0,t(l))≤π(m)(0,t(m)−1)<0
where the first inequality follows from Assumption 3 and the fact that t(l) < t(m). The second inequality follows from
equation (2.7). By monotonicity, am ≤al and equation (2.4) implies that
π(m)(al,t(l))=π(m)(0,t(l))≥0
– a contradiction. Hence it must be the case that t(1) ≤ t(1) ≤ t(2) ≤···≤ t(N) which completes the proof. ‖
Proof of Theorem 5. Suppose that the SRP equilibrium ratification time of player i in game G is given by t∗i =t˜∗i . Note
that G is equivalent to 0G. Hence, the equilibrium ratification time of player i in the game kG can be obtained by simply
relabelling the decision nodes of the game. This gives k t∗i =2k t˜∗i . The sequence xk ≡ 2
k t˜∗i 
2k converges to t˜
∗
i because, for
any 
>0, there exists an integer N
 such that xk − t˜∗i <
 for all k ≥N
 . To see this, notice that, by definition of the ceiling
function,
2k t˜∗i 
2k
− t˜∗i <
2k t˜∗i +1
2k
− t˜∗i︸ ︷︷ ︸
=2−k
,
and let N
 =
⌈
− ln
ln2
⌉
. By the same token, xk′ − t˜∗i <2−k
′
<2−k for all k′ >k. ‖
Proof of Theorem 6. Consider a pair of heterogeneous countries i and j with (limit) equilibrium ratification times
t˜∗i , t˜∗j , respectively. From Theorem 5, ratification times converge to t˜∗i and t˜∗j as the grid length goes to 0. In the
limit, clustering occurs if and only if t˜∗i = t˜∗j . To see this, consider the relative payoff to cooperation in the absence
of strategic complementarity, given by πi(a−i,t)=−φi +g(t). The equilibrium conditions (3.13) solve for t˜0l =g−1(φl)
where Assumption 3 has been invoked to invert g. Therefore, t˜0i = t˜0j is equivalent to g−1(φi)=g−1(φj). Since φ is a
continuous random variable and g−1 is strictly monotonic, this event has probability zero. In contrast, if payoff functions
exhibit increasing differences (γ >0) then it follows from the recursive definition of t˜∗(m) in equation (3.12) that limit
ratification times can be identical even among asymmetric countries. ‖
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